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PRIVATE AMICI CURIAE AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
1997-1998 TERM EMPLOYMENT LAW JURISPRUDENCE
Andrew P. Morriss*
The amicus curiae brief has become a common occurrence in today's legal
arena, especially with the proliferation ofprivate interest groups that specialize in
numerous topics ofpolitical and social interest. The substantial increase in the use
of amici briefs, however, has sparked criticism concerning both the costs (in effort
and resources) associated with filing these griefs and the persuasive effect (or lack
thereol) the briefs have on the Court. Much of this criticism arises from the failure
of many interest groups to posit "legal" arguments that apply the facts of a given
case to the law. Instead, the amici briefs often present policy arguments or unusual
factual theories, which ultimately renders them ineffective as useful legal tools.
In this Article, Professor Morriss explores the role of the amici and the influence
of the amicus curiae brief upon the Court in three recent Supreme Court Title VII
cases: Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. Morriss concludes that as more and
more private interest groups endeavor to emphasize their own importance by filing
amici briefs, the Court, rather than being enlightened, will be burdened by
information which lacks legal substance.
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Most people believe that the independence of the judiciary makes courts in
general, and federal courts in particular, relatively immune to political pressures. As
Richard Epstein sums it up "[t]he set of institutional structures that has been
introduced at the federal level has done its job."' Despite this immunity, however,
private interest groups' increasingly are filing amici briefs in many cases.3 Indeed,
Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitation of Public
Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 835 (1990).
2 I examine only private groups because the government's participation as amicus raises
different issues. For example, regulatory agencies regularly participate as amici to provide
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one prominent law firm partner argued that "[i]n today's world, effective
representation of your client requires that you at least seriously explore the possibility
of enlisting persuasive amicus support on your client's behalf."4 Some groups even
publicly solicit opportunities to participate as amici.'
the courts with their perspective on how the legal issues in a case relate to their regulatory
mission. As Professor David Ruder noted in his survey of Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC") amicus activity, this often brings the weight and prestige of the federal agency into
a private lawsuit on the side of one party. See David S. Ruder, The Development of Legal
Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The SEC Experience, 1989 WIs. L. REV. 1167,
1169 (1989).
See TIMOTHY J. O'NEILL, BAKKE & THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY: FRIENDS AND FOES IN
THE CLASSROOM OF LITIGATION 221 (1985) (stating that over 80% of the 1986-1991 term
full opinion cases have at least one amicus brief and, of those cases, the average number of
amicus briefs filed for each is four); Robert C. Bradley & Paul Gardner, Underdogs,
Upperdogs, and the Use of the Amicus Brief: Trends and Explanations, 10 JUST. SYS. J. 78,
78-80 (1985) (noting that the filing rate of amicus briefs by interest groups has increased
substantially); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda
Setting in the US. Supreme Court,.82 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 1109, 1111 (1988) ("At least since
the 1960s evidence of the participation of interest groups as amici curiae or sponsors has
virtually leaped from the pages of the United States Reports even on the most cursory
inspection."); Stephen Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92. The Revenge of the Amici,
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 269 (1993) ("Interested parties regularly flood the Supreme Court
with briefs .... "); Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 603
(1984) ("[U]se [of amicus briefs] is steadily and dramatically increasing."); John Howard,
Retaliation, Reinstatement and Friends of the Court: Amicus Participation in Brook v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 31 HOW. L.J. 241, 255 (1988) ("Amicus participation is no longer
an exception, it is now the rule."); Gregg Ivers & Karen O'Connor, Friends as Foes: The
Amicus Curiae Participation and Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties Union and
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement in Criminal Cases, 1969-1982, 9 LAW & POL'Y
161, 172 (1987) ("[Tlhe judicial process is now witnessing the articulation of competing
group interests to an ever increasing degree."); Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus
Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation: An Appraisal of Hakman's
"Folklore, "16 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 311, 318 (1981-1982) ("[A]micus curiae participation
by private groups is now the norm rather than the exception."). For further discussion of the
expanding role of amici, see Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae:
When Does the Party Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1246 (1992)
(explaining that district court amici sometimes are allowed "to actively engage in oral
argument, to introduce physical evidence, to examine witnesses, to conduct discovery, and
even to enforce previous court decisions upon party-participants to the litigation").
4 Ennis, supra note 3, at 604.
' See, e.g., ATLA, Membership Services. Amicus Curiae Request (visited Nov. 27,
1998) <http://www.arktla.org/memberservices/amicusform.html> (providing a form for
requesting participation by the American Trial Lawyers Association ("ATLA") Amicus
Curiae Committee); Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Guidelines for Requesting
Appearance of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan as Amicus Curiae
(visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http://www.icle.org/sections/family/journal/ads/guidereq.htm>
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In many instances amici briefs do not make "legal" arguments; that is, they tend
not to discuss the facts of the case or to apply law to the case in a legally meaningful
way. Instead, these briefs make policy arguments or promote unusual factual or legal
theories. As Chief Judge Richard Posner recently wrote in an opinion denying a
motion for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae: "The vast majority of amicus curiae
briefs are filed by allies of litigants and duplicate the arguments made in the litigant's
brief. Such amicus briefs should not be allowed. They are an abuse."6
Because these briefs cost the groups filing them considerable effort and
resources, 7 they are unlikely to be filed on a whim. Why do groups file these briefs?
Several possible explanations exist for this surge in amici. First, the groups involved
may believe (correctly or not) that their briefs affect the Supreme Court's decisions.8
Some observers believe amici briefs play an important role;9 even if the Court rejects
the group's preferred position, an amicus brief may push the Court in the "right"
direction.' ° Second, the amici briefs may serve an internal function, such as enabling
(providing guidelines for making a request that the Family Law Section of the Michigan State
Bar participate as amicus curiae in a particular matter).
6 Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997).
See also Ferguson v. Brick, 649 S.W.2d 397 (Ark. 1983). Reacting to Chief Judge Posner's
criticism of amici briefs in Ryan, Marc Fuller, the co-chair of the ATLA's Amicus Curiae
Committee, argued that courts should "welcome rather than spurn" amici briefs. Julie Gannon
Shoop, Too Many 'Friends': Appeals Judge Urges Limits on Amicus Briefs, 33 TRIAL, Dec.
1997, at 18 (quoting interview with Marc Fuller). He also argued that amici briefs help "level
the playing field" for plaintiffs. Id. at 19. This defense, and the institutional commitment
represented by the existence of the ATLA committee, support the view that amici believe
their role is important.
7 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 3, at 1112 (estimating that an amicus brief costs
between $15,000 and $20,000 to produce). Even when groups do not pay lawyers but instead
use their own counsel, they incur a substantial opportunity cost.
8 See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 3, at 603 ("Frequently, judicial rulings, and thus their
precendential value, will be narrower or broader than the parties had urged, because of a
persuasive amicus brief."); Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 3, at 167 ("It does seem fair to
speculate, however, that perhaps a greater number of interest groups believe that amicus
curiae participation may affect the outcome of a case."); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig,
The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C.
L. REv. 91, 141 (1993) ("The judiciary is subject to a determined campaign by lobbyists to
convince them that tort reform of punitive damages is vital."). One study suggested that
lawyers' "enormous egos" initiated involvement. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS
IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 31-32 (1995).
9 See Ennis, supra note 3, at 603 (arguing that amicus briefs are not "at best only icing
on the cake. In reality, they are often the cake itself'); Leo Pfeffer, Amici in Church-State
Litigation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 107-09 (arguing that amici briefs were key to
the Court's opinions in two important cases).
10 See WASBY, supra note 8, at 31 ("If the ACLU would trim, the [Court's] ultimate
position would be further off the mark." (quoting an ACLU attorney)).
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the groups to raise funds" or demonstrating to their membership that they are players
in a significant policy debate. 2 Third, interest groups may believe they have a
comparative advantage in the courts. 3 Fourth, amici briefs may serve as an
important signal to the Court about which cases to accept for review, regardless of
the merits of the amici's positions.'4 Fifth, interest groups may not be able to afford
direct participation (i.e., funding litigation) but want to make their voice heard. 5
Finally, groups may participate because they feel they must defend a principle. 6
More than one of these explanations, of course, may be true simultaneously.
This Article examines the amici briefs submitted in three recent Supreme Court
Title VII cases and attempts both to explain why the amici participated and to
evaluate the value of their participation. In order to do so, this Article examines the
Court's decisions and the arguments made by the amici and parties in three major
antidiscrimination cases from the 1997-1998 term: Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.,"7 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,"8 and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton. 9
This Article evaluates the amici's roles in these cases in several ways, relying
largely on the briefs themselves.2 First, I compare the arguments raised by the amici
See WASBY, supra note 8, at 77.
12 See O'NEILL, supra note 3, at 19; Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 3, at 170. Even
unfavorable rulings can produce revenue windfalls for interest groups. See, e.g., O'NEILL,
supra note 3, at 226-27, 230-31; WASBY, supra note 8, at 31-32 (noting the role of Bowers
v. Hardwick in promoting growth of Lambda's Legal Defense and Education Fund and
ACLU fundraising appeals which relied on unfavorable civil rights rulings).
'3 See WASBY, supra note 8, at xii (stating that much of literature is based on the notion
that civil rights groups turn to the courts because their opinions are going to carry less weight
in other "political" arenas or that the groups were effectively without power in those arenas).
" See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 3, at 1111 ("The filing of an amicus brief, apart
from the quality or persuasiveness of the arguments presented, provides the justices with an
indication of the array of social forces at play in the litigation.").
'" See KAREN O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS' USE OF THE COURTS 100-15
(1980) (describing the role of funding in determining the decisions of women's groups to file
amici briefs instead of directly participating in cases); O'NEILL, supra note 3, at 221-23;
O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 3, at 313 (explaining that the "chief' reason for amicus
participation is "a group's inability to fund major litigation from the trial stage").
16 See WASBY, supra note 8, at 31-32 ("[A] major reason [why public interest groups
litigate cases] is that there are principles to defend.").
'7 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
'8 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).19 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
20 This method is open to criticism-if the briefs merely are exercises in public relations
or fundraising, for example, perhaps a study of the groups' press campaigns or financial
documents would have been more appropriate. See, for example, WASBY, supra note 8, for
an excellent study of the influence of internal politics or civil rights litigation, and O'NEILL,
supra note 3, for an in-depth analysis of the role of amici in the Bakke case. Such studies are
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with those raised by the parties to determine whether the amici's arguments differ in
substance, type of argument, or the type of authority cited. Second, I examine the
impact of the amici briefs and determine whether the Supreme Court adopted their
method of reasoning, cited, or otherwise relied on the amici briefs.2 Finally, I
evaluate the collective role of the amici in the three cases.
I focus on the legal arguments, positions, and authorities because, as do perhaps
a minority of legal academics,22 I believe law is something distinct from the policy
preferences of interest groups or judges. Law demands legal analysis, and when
individuals or groups hire lawyers (even if the lawyers are working pro bono) to file
briefs with a court, they signal that they too believe the law matters. Thus, I interpret
these signals as an invitation to take the amici at their word-that they wish to
participate in a legal argument.23 I use the briefs as evidence to evaluate the kinds of
arguments the amici indicate are legitimate legal arguments.
Finally, I find that amici exert relatively little obvious influence on the Court, at
least in this small sample of cases. 4 Despite this apparent lack of success, the amici
clearly invested considerable resources in producing these briefs. As one
commentator noted, there are other ways to attempt to influence the Supreme Court:
"Those who have decided that the return on their efforts will be best maximized
fascinating and critical to understanding interest groups, but they represent a different
approach than that taken in this Article. Similarly, if one wishes to study organizational
conflict over the positions advocated in briefs, focus on the briefs would be inadequate. See
O'NEILL, supra note 3, at 7 (asserting that an amicus brief "represents the resolution of, and
does not reflect the debate within, an organization").
2 As Professors Caldeira and Wright note in their study of the impact of amici on the
selection of cases for review, "[b]ecause of the confidentiality of the conference and
individual deliberations, we have no means of knowing with certainty how the justices view
and value briefs amicus curiae prior to certiorari." Caldeira & Wright, supra note 3, at 1113.
Until access to the justices' 1997-1998 Term papers is granted (something that will not
happen for years, if at all), there can be no complete evaluation of the impact of the amici on
the evolution of the justices' decisions in these cases. The only meaningful evaluation that
currently can be conducted considers how the final opinions reflect the impact of the amici.
22 See RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE 5-7 (1998) (describing the
prevalence of the view that there are no internally-right answers to legal and constitutional
issues).
' O'Connor and Epstein suggest that the Supreme Court grants most requests to file
amicus briefs because these briefs actually assist the justices in dealing with their workload
by providing useful information. See Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Court Rules and
Workload.- A Case Study of Rules Governing Amicus Curiae Participation, 8 JUST. SYS. J.
35, 35-36 (1983). While I disagree that the briefs in Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher ultimately
proved useful to the Court (or at least should not have been useful), my approach is in some
respects similar to that of O'Connor and Epstein.
24 But see, e.g., Calkins, supra note 3, at 269 (noting that "amici played central roles" in




before the judicial branch have several alternatives... [which include] sponsoring
litigation, developing test cases, writing favorable law review articles [and] providing
expert testimony. ,2. As others who have studied amici participation in the past
have done,26 I suggest that the amici's view of their own efforts is akin to that of
groups lobbying before Congress. As they "lobby" the Court by marshalling policy
arguments and factual claims not supported by the record, the amici play a role in,
and are a symptom of, the decline of legal argument.
To the extent that law is more than a balancing of policy arguments-that is, to
the extent that right answers to legal questions exist-many of the arguments
advanced by amici in these cases are not part of legitimate legal argument. If law is
merely the result of choices among competing policy judgments by an antidemocratic
institution, we would be better advised to shift such decisions to more democratically
accountable institutions. Moreover, if we believe nonrecord facts matter in the
determination of the correct interpretation of statutes such as Title VII, we should
shift the choice to institutions better able to amass and evaluate evidence, such as
Congress and executive and independent agencies. This Article concludes, therefore,
that the behavior of amici in these cases reveals a belief in an inappropriate judicial
role.
Part I discusses the existing literature on the role of amici and the small public
choice literature on the courts as policymakers. Part II discusses the different amici
who participated in these cases. Part III briefly summarizes the three cases examined
here. Parts IV, V, and VI examine the role of amici in Oncale, Ellerth, and
Faragher. Finally, Part VII draws conclusions about the influence of amici on the
definition of antidiscrimination law.
I. COURTS AND AMICI
A. Courts
Courts are relatively weak institutions in many respects. Their jurisdiction is
limited to cases initiated by plaintiffs-unlike agencies and legislatures which may
seek out new areas in which to act. The judicial budgets are relatively small-the
federal government spends only a tiny fraction of its budget on the judicial branch.27
25 Howard, supra note 3, at 254.
26 See, e.g., O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 3; Susan M. Olson, The Political Evolution
of Interest Group Litigation, in GOVERNING THROUGH THE COURTS 225-58 (Richard A.L.
Gambitta et al. ed., 1981); KAY L. SCHOLZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY passim (1986).
27 See, e.g., Victor Williams, Keep the Federal Judiciary Out of the Budget Battle,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Jan. 29, 1996, at 19, available in 1996 WL 5038927 (estimating
that the judiciary receives less than 0.002% of the federal budget).
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Rules of evidence limit the ability of courts to gather useful information (i.e., the
hearsay rule).
Yet courts are also powerful institutions. They have a significant influence on
the state of law through their interpretation of the common law, statutes, and
constitutions. Even when the other branches possess the power to overrule the Court
without resorting to constitutional amendments, opponents of Supreme Court
opinions have found it quite difficult to overturn "bad" precedent-as illustrated by
the lengthy struggle that ultimately led to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 28
Theoretically, the courts are not meant to act as a "super-legislature" by imposing
their preferences through their decisions. In practice, however, it is difficult to
counter the legal realist criticism that, at least some of the time, courts manage to
sneak a little legislating into their decisions.2 9 This is particularly true of the Supreme
Court, in which it appears that both constitutional and statutory interpretation
sometimes are influenced more by personal preferences than by fidelity to a coherent
theory of interpretation.3"
In Title VII opinions, the Court has given the impression that it is willing to act
legislatively, at least when Congress arguably has been unclear.3' For example, the
Court found that hostile environment sexual harassment constitutes discrimination
under Title VII,32 although there is no provision in the statute that directly mentions
sexual harassment.33 Including sexual harassment in Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination may or may not be beneficial, but it certainly is difficult to see how
a court committed to interpreting statutes found it there. The Court's willingness to
make broad readings of Title VII means that those with interests affected by the
interpretations of the statute can anticipate a wide range of possible outcomes. Such
28 Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (overturning the Supreme Court's decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
29 'See, e.g., WASBY, supra note 8, at 197 (recounting how a judge's former law clerk,
appointed to a prisoner complaint case, "realized that the judge was 'interested in additional
prisoner litigation' and 'persuaded his client to enlarge the case into a class action on behalf
of all inmates,"' and how a federal judge lobbied NAACP officials to adopt "a more
aggressive posture" in a case); Caldeira & Wright, supra note 3, at 1115 (summarizing
evidence that biases are shown throughout case selection).
30 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does?), 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 40 (1993) ("When a really new case
arises, the rules of the judicial game require the judge to act the part of a legislator and
therefore vote his values, although the rules do not require and may even forbid him to
acknowledge that this is what he is doing.").
3' Although he is arguing from a quite different policy perspective, Professor Stephen
Plass makes a similar criticism when he contends that the Supreme Court "has demonstrated
a willingness to act outside of constitutional constraints" in civil rights cases. Stephen A.
Plass, The Foreign Amici Dilemma, 1995 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1995).
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e etseq. (1994).
13 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 ('1986).
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a broad range provides a much greater incentive to invest in the production of amici
briefs than might a narrower range of possible interpretations.34 Similarly, the
Court's practice of making vague, general statements about key terms in Title V11 35
gives potential amici an incentive to invest in persuading the Court to adopt their own
interpretation of those terms in future cases.
B. The Development of the Role of Amici
Amici curiae have a long history in the American and English legal systems,
which has been surveyed thoroughly elsewhere.36 Over time, this role has evolved
from what Samuel Krislov calls "oral 'Shephardizing,' the bringing up of cases not
known to the judge" 37 into an institution characterized by "partisanship" and
"advocacy."3
Amici can play a wide range of roles in the courts, and a number of factors
influence the type of role they play in a given case. Particularly in the civil rights
arena, in which relations between civil rights groups and the government "are
characterized by division of labor, cooperation and conflict,"39 the government's
position may influence the role of amici. Interest groups may take the same "side"
as the government, and when they do, they may cooperate to a greater or lesser extent
with the government. Arguments may be made in parallel, or an amicus brief may
cast the government's position in a more moderate light.4" Conflict with the
government may lead to more vigorous participation, and groups may intervene
directly rather than rely on amicus participation to ensure the group's goals are not
shortchanged by the government.4
Legal doctrine also influences the pool of amici and, hence, influences their
roles: The decision in Roe v. Wade, for example, "spur[red] the development of pro-
life organizations."42 Doctrinal threats to organizations, whether substantive or
14 Those seeking an expansive interpretation can hope for an exceptionally good outcome,
while those seeking a narrow interpretation must fear the same.
35 See infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
36 See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE
L.J. 694 (1963).
17 Id. at 695.
38 Id. at 704. See also sources cited supra note 3.
" WASBY, supra note 8, at 21; see also lvers & O'Connor, supra note 3, at 165 (noting
that the Nixon administration "formally endorsed" a pro-law enforcement amicus's activities
in 1971 and often invited the leader of the amicus group to the White House for bill
signings).
40 See id at 21-22.
41 See id. at22.
42 Id. at 35; see also Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 3, at 164 (describing the rise of pro-
law enforcement amicus group as, at least partially, a reaction to ACLU successes).
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procedural (i.e., standing), motivate participation as well.43 Internal organizational
politics, such as struggles between legal staffs and directors, also may affect the
amici's roles.44 The Supreme Court's increased willingness, since the 1950s, to
tackle public policy issues that it previously avoided also has encouraged more
groups to participate as amici. 5 Not only has the Court taken a more expansive view
of its role than in earlier decades, but it also has done so in the context of interpreting
an increasing number of federal statutes aimed at contentious social issues.4 6 As
Professors Bradley and Gardner explain: "Unfortunately for the work load of the
Court, these acts were often phrased in ambiguous language and included novel and
complex legal concepts.
47
Amicus participation also offers a means of involvement when the control over
litigation in a particular area is out of reach of a particular group. As Stephen Wasby
notes, "litigating organizations must often respond to other litigators, independent of
litigation they would like to undertake., 4' Amici participation gives the brief writers
freedom "to pursue a type of social commentary not available through a litigant's
brief' and to shape positions "to ameliorate conflicts within their sponsoring
organizations" in ways not possible if representing a party.49 For many attorneys,
therefore, writing an amicus brief is more attractive than direct involvement in a case.
Organizations also choose amicus participation for varied reasons. Amici
participation allows a group to spread its influence over a wider range of cases than
would be possible if the group were to focus on direct litigation support. For
example, the landmark 1971 Title VII case, Griggs v. Duke Power,0 cost $100,000
to litigate before the Supreme Court.5 Cases today are even more complex and can
last for decades.52
Political theory also offers a variety of justifications for amici. For example,
some commentators argue that actions ofamici, together with other forms of political
action, can serve as democratic "institutional restraint[s]" on the Supreme Court."
43 See WASBY, supra note 8, at 35. Professor O'Neill's analysis of amici participation in
Bakke concluded that "[t]he survival needs of many organizations took precedence over the
goals they were formed to achieve" in determining their role in Bakke. O'NEILL, supra note
3, at 63.
44 See, e.g., O'NEILL, supra note 3, at 114 (quoting one staff member's description of the
ACLU Bakke brief as a "coup").
41 See Bradley & Gardner, supra note 3, at 81-82.
46 See id.
47 Id. at 81.
48 WASBY, supra note 8, at 45.
49 O'NEILL, supra note 3, at 144.
50 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
51 See WASBY, supra note 8, at 123.
52 See, e.g, id. at 127 (noting that many employment discrimination cases last up to 10
years).
"' See Plass, supra note 31, at 1195. Such restraints seem wrong both as a matter of
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Others argue that an amicus can serve as "a mechanism fostering pluralistic decision
making."54
In short, amici can play a variety of roles which can be classified into two broad
categories: legal and lobbying. When amici play a legal role, they attempt to inform
the Court of legal arguments or considerations not raised by the parties. For example,
an amicus might be better placed than the parties to argue the parameters of a
potential affirmative defense because the facts of a particular case make it clear that
any reasonable formulation of the defense would or would not apply. When amici
play a lobbying role, however, they attempt to persuade the Court that the law should
follow a particular course. This course is chosen not based on statutory
construction," but rather because the amici desire the law to follow that path. Thus,
an amicus might argue that an affirmative defense ought to exist with respect to a
particular statutory provision, not because of the legislative history or statutory
language, but because liability would harm a class of employers and produce
unemployment. Alternately, an amicus might follow the practical advice offered by
a well-known litigator that amicus briefs should be crafted to catch the attention of
"swing vote" justices. 6 Such advice confirms the primacy of the lobbying role.
There are many ways to categorize amici.57 In this Article I will use one main
distinction: interest versus expertise. Amici may have a direct interest in the subject
matter of a case. For example, employers are interested in the interpretation of Title
VII because they may be sued under the law. Similarly, plaintiffs' lawyers have a
significant interest in the interpretation of the statute because it directly affects their
ability to win cases for their clients. Interests may be larger than pocketbook issues,
of course; both employers' and plaintiffs' counsel are likely to believe strongly in the
justice of their positions. Issues also may relate indirectly to pocketbook
interests-funding issues are often critical for many of the organizations involved in
these cases.5 In theory, interest alone is not enough to justify amicus participation. 9
theory and as a practical matter. Majoritarian restraints on the Supreme Court would weaken
its role as a counter-majoritarian institution. Moreover, even proponents of such restraints
concede amici are ineffective at performing this role without the support of political
branches, making it moot as a practical matter. See id. at 1227-28.
54 O'NEILL, supra note 3,at 18.
" Disputes may exist over the proper principles of statutory construction. Almost
everyone, however, will concede that legitimate and illegitimate grounds exist, even if they
disagree on the margins about which are which.
56 See Ennis, supra note 3, at 608-09.
7 See O'NEILL, supra note 3, at 62-63 (distinguishing amici based on advocacy
goals-interest groups, minority-defense organizations, and public interest organizations-
and scope, based on "the breadth and variety of arguments" used in the organization's
internal debates over its position); WASBY, supra note 8, at 51 (relying on a distinction
between membership-based groups and those with only contributors).
58 See WASBY, supra note 8, at 77 ("Resource mobilization and resource allocation are
often related. Strategies undertaken are also a function of both the amount and types of
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Most of the amici in these cases, however, appear to believe interest alone would
justify their participation.6"
Second, amici may have expertise that relates to a question in a case. Human
resource managers, for example, frequently deal with a wide range of matters affected
by antidiscrimination law. They are in a position to provide insights, not only into
how a particular interpretation might affect the subgroup of cases that courts
experience, but also into the broader range of employer-employee and employee-
employee interactions that occur in the workplace.6 Expertise can take other forms
as well: Law professors who have extensive teaching and research experience in a
particular field may be able to offer a critique of potential rules that provides a "big
picture."
These interests and expertise may be mixed together in various combinations.
A specialized bar association has an economic interest in creating rules that benefit
it or its clients,62 as well as specialized knowledge acquired from its collective
professional experience. Law professors may have both expertise and ideological
preferences and/or professional interests in promoting the development of a subject
which they enjoy teaching. Unsurprisingly, the amici in the cases studied in this
Article do not provide clear examples of just one type of interest. Sorting out the
interests presented by a group may be useful nonetheless, because the types of
arguments made by the parties may suggest that a particular type of interest
predominates.
resources available."). Wasby also noted that there is an "endemic lack of resources" for civil
rights and civil liberties organizations. Id at 80.
9 See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (1997).
An amicus brief should normally be allowed when a party is not represented
competently or is not represented at all, when the amicus has an interest in some
other case that may be affected by the decision in the present case (though not
enough affected to entitle the amicus to intervene and become a party in the
present case), or when the amicus has unique information or perspective that can
help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide.
Id. See also Ferguson v. Brick, 649 S.W.2d 397, 399-400 (1983) ("[H]enceforth, we will
deny permission to file a brief when the purpose is nothing more than to make a political
endorsement of the basic brief.").
60 See infra notes 64-127 and accompanying text.
61 See also Calkins, supra note 3, at 270 (describing amici's role as providing "a reality
check").
62 In some cases, specialized bars may benefit from rules that do not benefit their clients.
For example, defense attorneys benefit from the additional work provided by liberal





Of the four briefs filed in Faragher and two each in Oncale and Ellerth, six
amici participated on the side of the employer. Table I provides a summary of this
amici participation. Three employer-side amici participated in only one of these
cases, one participated in two, and one participated in all three.63
Table 1: Amici Participation
CASE
AMICI Faragher v. Burlington Oncale v.
City of Boca Industries, Inc. Sundowner
Raton v. Ellerth Offshore
Services, Inc.
Government
EEOC X X --
Pro-Plaintiff
AFL-CIO X X
Lawyers' Committee for Civil X - X+
Rights Under Law/ACLU
American Trial Lawyers - - X
Association
Men's groups - - X
Gay and Lesbian groups - - X
Law professors - - X
Rutherford Institute - X
National Women's Law Center/ X X+ X+*
Equal Rights Advocates/
Women's Legal Defense Fund
National Employment Lawyers X X X
Association
Pro-Defendant
Equal Employment Advisory X X X
Council I
63 See infra Table 1: Amici Participation, at 835-36.
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National Association of X -
Manufacturers/Manufacturers
Alliance for Productivity and
Innovation
Society for Human Resource X
Management
Chamber of Commerce of the X X -
United States
Texas Association of Business - - X
and Chambers of Commerce
1. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States ("CCUS") filed amici briefs in
Faragher and Ellerth. 4 It stated its interest as stemming from its members' "vital
interest" in the outcome of the cases in which it participated because most of its
members are potential defendants in Title VII cases.65 An "important function" of
the CCUS is "represent[ing] the interests of its members in the federal courts in cases
addressing issues of widespread concern to the American business community."
66
Although it could have claimed expertise in the matter, because some of its members
presumably have been actual defendants in Title VII matters and because its members
have significant experience as employers, the CCUS made no explicit expertise
claim. It did note that it regularly appeared as amicus before the Court, including
participation in employment discrimination cases.67
2. The Equal Employment Advisory Council
The Equal Employment Advisory Council ("EEAC") filed amici briefs in all
three cases. 6' The EEAC is made up of "over 300'of the nation's largest private
64 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
in Support of Petitioner, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296 [hereinafter CCUS Brief, Ellerth]; Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Support of Respondent,
Faragher, 1998 WL 32508 [hereinafter CCUS Brief, Faragher].
65 See CCUS Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296, at * 1-*2; CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL
32508, at * 1-*2.
66 CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508, at *1.
67 See id.; CCUS Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296, at * 1.
68 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of
Respondent, Oncale, 1997 WL 634312 [hereinafter EEAC Brief, Oncale]; Brief Amicus
Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of Respondent Faragher,
1998 WL 32488 [hereinafter EEAC Brief, Faragher]; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal
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sector corporations" and was organized in 1976 "to promote sound approaches to the
elimination of employment discrimination." '69 Based on its directors' and officers'
experience in personnel matters and antidiscrimination law, the EEAC claimed "a
unique depth of understanding of the practical, as well as legal, considerations
relevant to the proper interpretation and application of equal employment principles
and requirements."70 This understanding made the EEAC "well situated to brief the
Court on the relevant concerns of the business community and the significance of this
case to employers."'" In addition to this expertise, the EEAC noted that its members
would be affected directly by the decision and, thus, the issues were "extremely
important to the nationwide constituency that EEAC represents. 72 The EEAC is a
repeat player in employment discrimination cases, filing numerous amici briefs in the
U.S. Supreme Court, courts of appeals, and various state supreme courts. 73
In Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher, the EEAC simultaneously was acting as a
provider of information (offering "practical" expertise derived from its members'
experience with the implementation of antidiscrimination laws74) and as an interest
group ("briefjing] the Court on the relevant concerns of the business community 71).
3. The National Association of Manufacturers/The Manufacturers Alliance for
Productivity and Innovation
The National Association of Manufacturers and the Manufacturers Alliance for
Productivity and Innovation filed ajoint brief in Faragher;76 neither participated in
Employment Advisory Council in Support of Petitioner, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294 [hereinafter
EEAC Brief, Ellerth].
69 EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *2. See EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL
93294, at * 1-'2; EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634312, at *2.
70 EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *2. See EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL
93294, at *2; EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634312, at *2.
7' EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *5. See EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL
93294, at *4.
72 EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *2. See EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL
634312, at *2; EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294, at *3.
7' See EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *4 (citing cases in which the EEAC
filed amici briefs, including three Supreme Court cases, four courts of appeals cases on the
same issue, and an unspecified number of state court cases); EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL
634312, at *3-*4 (citing cases in which the EEAC filed amici briefs and noting participation
of the EEAC in EEOC rulemaking); EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294, at *3-*4 (citing
cases in which the EEAC participated).
74 See EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *2; EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL
634312, at *2; EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294, at *2.
7' EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *5. See EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL
634312, at *2; EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294, at *4.
76 See Brief Amici Curiae of the National Association of Manufacturers and
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Oncale or Ellerth. The National Association of Manufacturers ("NAM") is a broad-
based industrial trade association with a significant number of large employers as
members.77 The Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation ("MAPI")
is a "nonprofit research organization supported by some 450 manufacturing
companies from a broad range of industries."7" MAPI maintains "two standing
Human Resource Committees" which keep the membership in touch with important
legal developments concerning Title VII.
Both the NAM and the MAPI asserted interests in "maintaining work
environments that are free from harassment," in "ensuring that the standard of
employer liability for the unauthorized acts of employees is interpreted consistently
with the text of Title VII," and in "clarify[ing] the standard of employer liability so
that needless litigation can be avoided."79 Both groups thus asserted interests based
on their status as representatives of entities affected by the law. Although neither
explicitly claimed it, based on their members' experience, both also presumably
could offer expertise on workplace issues.
4. The Society for Human Resource Management
The Society for Human Resource Management ("SHRM") filed an amicus brief
only in Faragher.0 The SHRM is a professional association of human resource
personnel, with 90,000 members around the world." The SHRM stated its interest
in the case as "the orderly development of the law defining, in practical terms, the
meaning of nondiscrimination and equal employment opportunity and, more
specifically, the nature and scope of an employer's obligation to provide a workplace
free from sexual harassment."82 In Faragher, the "SHRM's interest [was] to protect
its members by supporting rules that encourage employers to initiate and maintain,
and employees to use, procedures that address sexual harassment complaints." 3
Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation in Support of Respondent, Faragher,
1998 WL 32489 [hereinafter NAM/MAPI Brief, Faragher].71 See id. at *1.
78 Id.
79 Id. at *2.
80 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Society for Human Resource Management in Support
of Respondent, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at *1 [hereinafter SHRM Brief, Faragher].
81 See id. at* 1 -*2.
82 Id. at *2.
83 Id. The employee-petitioner's position in Faragher, the SHRM argued, "would
encourage employees to bypass internally established mechanisms and prematurely seek
judicial redress for most acts of alleged harassment by supervisors." Id. at *3.
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5. The Texas Association of Business & Chambers of Commerce
The Texas Association of Business & Chambers of Commerce ("TAB&CC")
filed an amicus brief in only one case, Oncale8 The TAB&CC is a nonprofit
corporation which represents more than 6,000 businesses, 10,000 individuals, and
300 chambers of commerce in Texas.85 The organization stated its interest was
simply to combat the "[p]etitioner [who] is asking the Court to adopt a position that
would have a grave and unfair effect on employers.8 6 It thus stated a purely
representational interest. Although its members' experiences with Title VII might
have been a basis for an experience-based claim, the circumstances leading up to
Oncale made that less likely."7
B. Pro-Employee Amici
Twenty-eight amici participated on the side of the employees through fourteen
briefs in the three cases, with six amici participating in Faragher through four briefs,
twenty-three in Oncale through six briefs, and six in Ellerth through four briefs. 8
Twenty-two employee-side amici participated in only one case, four participated in
two cases, and two participated in all three.89
84 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Texas Association of Business & Chambers of Commerce




87 Because the Fifth Circuit recently decided that same-sex sexual harassment was not
covered by Title VII in Garcia v. ElfAtochem North America, 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994),
Texas employers likely did not have sufficient experience with the rule the TAB&CC
opposed to bring any expertise to bear on the issue.
88 See supra Table 1: Amici Participation, at 835-36.
89 See id. These figures do not reflect that the National Organization of Women ("NOW")
Legal Defense Fund also participated as counsel to a party in one case.
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1. Feminist Groups
Five feminist groups participated in these cases.' One (the National Women's
Law Center) participated as amici in all three cases.9 Another (the NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund) participated as amici in two and as employee counsel
in one.92 Equal Rights Advocates participated in both Faragher and Ellerth.93 The
Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund and the Northwest Women's Law
Center only participated in Oncale.94
In Oncale, five feminist groups (the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
the Women's Legal Defense Fund, the National Women's Law Center, the
Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund, and the Northwest Women's Law
Center) participated in a coalition with civil liberties groups and gay and lesbian
rights groups. All five groups asserted interest and, at least implicitly, expertise-
based claims.95
In Ellerth, four feminist organizations filed ajoint brief. All four groups asserted
interest and, at least implicitly, expertise-based claims.96
In Faragher, three groups (the National Women's Law Center, Equal Rights
Advocates, and the Women's Legal Defense Fund) filed a joint brief. Although the
three organizations made no explicit claim to expertise in the area, their long histories
of involvement in employment discrimination matters entitled them to a claim at least
90 See Brief Amici Curiae of National Women's Law Center, Equal Rights Advocates,
and Women's Legal Defense Fund on Behalf of Petitioner, Faragher, 1997 WL 800075
[hereinafter NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher]; Brief Amici Curiae of Equal Rights
Advocates, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Partnership for Women &
Families, and National Women's Law Center on Behalf of Respondent, Ellerth, 1998 WL
145349 [hereinafter ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/NWLC Brief, Ellerth]. In Oncale, the NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Women's Legal Defense Fund, National Women's Law
Center, Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund, Inc., and Northwest Women's Law
Center all joined in the Lambda Coalition Brief. See Brief of the Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, American Civil Liberties Union, People for the American Way, NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, National Center for
Lesbian Rights, National Women's Law Center, Connecticut Women's Education and Legal
Fund, Inc., Northwest Women's Law Center, and Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 1997 WL 471805 [hereinafter Lambda Coalition
Brief, Oncale].
" See NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, at * 1; ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/NWLC
Brief, Ellerth, at * 1; Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, at * 1.
92 See ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/NWLC Brief, Ellerth, at * 1; Lambda Coalition Brief,
Oncale, at * 1.
9 See NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, at *1; ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/NWLC
Brief, Ellerth, at * 1.
" See Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, at * 1.
9' See id.
96 See ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/NWLC Brief, Ellerth, at * 1.
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equal to those of amici making such a claim explicitly. The need for a coalition of




The American Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-
CIO") filed an amicus brief in Ellerth98 and Faragher.99 The AFL-CIO made no
explicit declaration of interest, other than to describe itself as a federation whose
constituent unions have a membership of "approximately 13,000,000 working men
and women. '""°l Its interests include the interests of its organizational members and
their individual members in a harassment-free workplace, its institutional interest in
ensuring that Title VII is interpreted consistent with the unions' interests,'' and its
expertise from the experience of its member unions in arbitration proceedings.
3. The National Employment Lawyers Association
The National Employment Lawyers Association ("NELA") filed briefs in all
three cases in support ofthe employees.0 2 The NELA is a specialized bar association
97 See WASBY, supra note 8, at 50 (describing the formation of multiple feminist legal
groups in 1960s and 1970s); see also O'Connor, supra note 15 (describing the differing roles
of various organizations).
9' See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations in Support of the Respondent, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145348 [hereinafter
AFL-CIO Brief, Ellerth].
99 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations in Support of Petitioner, Faragher, 1997 WL 799994 [hereinafter
AFL-CIO Brief, Faragher].
'0 AFL-CIO Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145348, at *1.
101 The involvement of unions with employment discrimination can be explained both as
a (relatively late blooming) ideological commitment and as a means of securing legislation
that reduces the differential between union and nonunion labor costs. In particular, labor
unions often have been accused of fostering discriminatory practices, both directly and
indirectly, through advocacy of seniority-based schemes that favored white employees.
Regardless of whether such practices are motivated by discriminatory intent, they indicate
a clear divergence between the interests of unions and those of civil rights organizations. See
RAY MARSHALL ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 26-60 (1978) (describing Title VII cases with regard to
construction industry union hiring hall practices); William B. Gould, Black Power in the
Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46, passim
(1969).
102 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Association in Support
of Petitioner, Oncale, 1997 WL 458806 [hereinafter NELA Brief, Oncale]; Motion for Leave
to File Brief Out of Time of the National Employment Lawyers Association, Faragher, 1998
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of over 3,000 plaintiff's attorneys in the areas of labor, employment, and civil
rights.1 13 Its asserted interest was protecting its members' clients "by helping to
ensure that Title VII's goal of eradicating employment discrimination is fully
realized."'" In addition, the NELA argued in Oncale that rules making employment
discrimination cases hard to prove disadvantaged its members and members'
clients."°
As a specialized bar association, the NELA has an obvious interest in
perpetuating and expanding the area of practice from which its members derive their
income. The self-interest of its members also suggests that its interests include
expanding the role of lawyers in interpreting antidiscrimination law.
4. Civil Liberties Groups
Three civil liberties groups participated in these cases: the Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law participated in Faragher;1°" the American Civil Liberties
Union participated in Faragher and Oncale; °7 and People for the American Way
participated in Oncale. °8
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") is a nationwide, membership-
based nonprofit organization with almost 300,000 members." It has been an active
participant in Title VII cases before the Supreme Court. Unlike some interest groups,
its involvement in cases often is determined through a decentralized decision-making
process." ° In defining its interest, it stated that "[b]ecause the ACLU believes that
an appropriate test for employer liability is critical to the effective enforcement of
WL 35180 [hereinafter NELA Brief, Faragher]; Brief Amicus Curiae of the National
Employment Lawyers Association in Support of Respondent, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353
[hereinafter NELA Brief, Ellerth].
'03 See NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353, at * 1; NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL
35180, at *1; NELA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 458806, at *2.
'04 NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353, at *2; see also NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998
WL 35180, at *2; NELA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 458806, at *3.
0'5 See NELA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 458806, at *2.
106 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Laywers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and
the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Petitioner, Faragher, 1998 WL 800001
[hereinafter Lawyers' Committee/ACLU Brief, Faragher].
'07 See Lawyers' Committee/ACLU Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 80001; Lambda Coalition
Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471805.
08 See Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471805.
109 See WASBY, supra note 8, at 66; Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae and
Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the American Civil
Liberties Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Faragher, 1997 WL 800001, at
*2 [hereinafter Lawyers' Committee/ACLU Brief, Faragher].
110 See WASBY, supra note 8, at 66-67.
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Title VII-for women as well as for racial minorities-the ACLU has a substantial
interest in the proper resolution of the case.""'
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law ("Lawyers' Committee")
is an elite bar organization made up of bar leaders and law school deans which
handles many discrimination cases." 2
People for the American Way is "a nonpartisan citizens' organization" founded
in 1980 which aims "to promote and protect civil and constitutional rights.""' 3 It is
"actively involved" in antidiscrimination law issues, including extension of coverage
to gay men and lesbians "through such activities as supporting the enactment of civil
rights legislation, participating in civil rights litigation, and conducting programs and
studies directed at reducing problems of bias, injustice, and discrimination.""' 4 It
sought to participate in Oncale "to help vindicate the important interests at stake.""' 5
All three groups thus made explicit interest group claims for the Court's attention
as well as implicit expertise claims based on their prior experience in litigating Title
VII claims.
5. The Rutherford Institute
The Rutherford Institute filed an amicus brief only in Ellerth."6 The Institute is
a nonprofit organization that provides "legal services nationwide in defense of civil
and religious liberties."'"7 Perhaps best known for its role in the Paula Jones sexual
harassment suit against President Clinton,"' it has filed numerous amici briefs on a
wide range of topics." 9 The Institute's role thus was akin, at least theoretically, to
that of the ACLU, providing representation to an interest and providing expertise
based on its frequent participation in such cases.
" Lawyers' Committee/ACLU Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 800001, at *2. Interestingly,
the ACLU neglected to include white men in the group it sought to protect, perhaps
forgetting that Congress intended Title VII to outlaw all forms of racial and sexual
discrimination. See, e.g., O'NEILL, supra note 3, at 105-17 (describing the conflict within the
ACLU over its role in Bakke).
12 See Lawyers' Committee/ACLU Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 800001, at * 1; see also
WASBY, supra note 9, at 64-65.
11 Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471805, at *4a.
114 Id at *4a-*5a.
11 Id. at *5a.
116 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Rutherford Institute in Support of Respondent, Ellerth,
1998 WL 151471 [hereinafter Rutherford Brief, Ellerth].
117 Id. at *1-2.
"'8 Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998). See Megan Rosenfeld, On the
Case for Paula Jones; She Needed a New Lawyer, and John Whitehead, Advocate of
Religious Freedom, Rushed to Volunteer, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1998, at B I (describing the
Rutherford Institute's role in Jones).
See Rutherford Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 151471, at *2.
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6. The American Trial Lawyers Association
The American Trial Lawyers Association ("ATLA") filed an amicus brief in only
one case, Oncale."'2 The ATLA is a specialized bar association of "approximately
50,000 attorneys who primarily represent plaintiffs in personal injury, civil rights and
commercial law cases."'' Its formal statement of interest noted only that the ATLA
believes that the "refusal of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
to recognize any claim for same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII . . .
jeopardizes the national policy of nondiscrimination in employment and erodes the
right of employees to be free from sexual and gender harassment in the
workplace."'2
In addition to this ideological interest, the ATLA had a potential expertise claim,
which it did not assert, based on its members' litigation experience. It also had a
self-interest claim in its members' financial stake in promoting additional causes of
action.
7. Coalition of Men's and Sexual Assault Groups
A coalition of fourteen groups concerned with issues surrounding men and
sexual violence filed a joint brief authored by Professor Catharine MacKinnon
("MacKinnon Coalition"). Although it is difficult to summarize briefly the
interests of a coalition made up of so many organizations, they all share similar
organizational goals related to their views on sexuality. Thus, for example, the lead
member of the coalition, the National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization,
Inc. ("NOMSV"), "believes that sexual harassment, homophobia, and male privilege
to engage in violent/aggressive behaviors are all norms that contribute to a social
context that breeds sexual abuse."'2 4 The groups also similarly define their interests
in the case. NOMSV, for example, had an interest "because it involves the sexual
victimization of a male, because NOMSV is intent on stopping such abusive
incidents from occurring, and because NOMSV is committed to changing social
norms that contribute to such incidents."'2 5 These groups thus both assert expertise
in the subject matter and an interest in the outcome.
12 See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America in Support
of the Petitioner, Oncale, 1997 WL 453675 [hereinafter ATLA Brief, Oncale].
121 Id. at *2.
122 Id
23 See Brief Amicus Curiae of National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc.
et al. in Support of Petitioner, Oncale, 1997 WL 47184 [hereinafter MacKinnon Coalition
Brief, Oncale].





A group of twenty-nine law professors "who teach employment law,
discrimination law, women, gender, or race and the law" filed an amicus brief in
Oncale.'26 The law professors made an explicit expertise claim based on the
inconsistent decisions of the courts of appeals, the professors' own studies of "the
history and fundamental principles that underlie sexual harassment doctrine
specifically, and discrimination law generally.""'
C. Summary
Amici participated more heavily on the employee-side in these three cases
(twenty-eight to eight), although the disparity is less if one counts briefs rather than
participants (fourteen to six). Amici also participated more heavily in Oncale than
in Ellerth or Faragher; and participation in Oncale was much heavier on the side of
the employee, whether counting briefs or amici, than in the other two cases.
The greater participation in Oncale by employee-side amici can be explained by
two differences between it and the other cases. First, employers probably correctly
perceive same-sex sexual harassment as a much less prevalent problem in the
workplace than opposite-sex sexual harassment. Interest groups on the employee-
side, however, most likely saw Oncale as an opportunity to expand the reach of Title
VII in a symbolically important way. Moreover, as demonstrated by their briefs,
these groups had significantly different strategies for pursuing the issue of same-sex
harassment.
Second, Ellerth and Faragher raised issues that generally would have significant
impacts on employers' liability for sexual harassment, while casting the issues in
legal terms that made the issues appear less important to nonlawyers. The two sets
of interest groups thus perceived the relative importance of the cases in opposite
terms.
Although the amici in these cases could make some claim to expertise in
workplace discrimination matters-whether from long experience representing one
side or the other, from being sued themselves, or from academic study-most did not
emphasize their expertise in formally stating their interest. They chose instead to
emphasize their interests in promoting what they viewed as the appropriate legal rule
in terms similar to that with which an interest group might approach a member of
Congress.
One might ask why the Supreme Court should care what interest groups think
about the appropriateness of a legal rule. Even if a group is concerned purely with
126 See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Oncale, 1997
WL 531305, at * la-*4a [hereinafter Law Professors' Brief, Oncale].
17 Id. at*Ia.
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advocating a position that fits its policy preferences, why do the amici not make more
of an effort to hide their naked policy preferences behind at least a fig leaf of
expertise? What comes across clearly in the statements of interest is that these
groups believe that their views count because of who they "represent." The
prevalence of coalition briefs reinforces this impression-amassing multiple
"authors" behind a brief appears to give it additional weight, at least to those filing
the briefs. The groups' own statements of interest thus suggest that the amici saw
themselves primarily as lobbyists.
III. THE CASES
The Supreme Court has decided relatively few cases dealing directly with Title
VII. 2' When it decided to consider three major cases in one term, the Court signaled
a significant change in its willingness to shape the interpretation of the statute. This
section briefly describes the significance and background of the three cases in which
the amici participated.
Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher are representative of the "new" civil rights cases.
Unlike pre-Civil Rights Act of 1964 cases, which involved "almost exclusively
constitutional litigation," after the 1964 Act the emphasis shifted to statutory
issues. 12 9 This "watershed"' 30 produced several important changes in civil rights
litigation. First, the cases became much more complex legally because they involved
more than constitutional issues.' Second, as the cases increasingly involved more
complex facts rather than facially discriminatory statutes, attention shifted to the
more subtle fact patterns.' Third, the civil rights coalition itself became more
complex as women, Hispanics, gays and other groups began to assert their own
interests in addition to, and sometimes in opposition to, black civil rights
organizations.' The new members' interests sometimes conflicted with those of
more traditional civil rights and civil liberties organizations. Moreover, "[n]o one
entity like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund [did in the early school desegregation
cases] could control litigation under Title VII" because so many organizations, as
well as the Justice Department, became involved. 34
128 The first case was Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See WASBY, supra
note 8, at 17.
129 WASBY, supra note 8, at xiv.
"3 Id. at xiv.
... See id at xv.
132 See id. atxv, 121-22.
33 See id. at xv.
134 Id. at 50.
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A. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
Title VII does not mention sexual orientation; indeed, it mentions sex only as a
result of a historical fluke in which opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 added
it as a prohibited ground for discrimination in hopes of preventing the bill's
passage.'35 This quirk in the legislative history means that there is no substantive
legislative history of the language regarding sex as a prohibited ground for
discrimination. The courts of appeal thus have wrestled with the issue of how to
apply the statute when both the harasser and the victim are of the same sex.
Most courts concluded that the statutory language barring discrimination
"because of... sex"'136 meant that any conduct that was sexual in nature could serve
as the basis for a claim.137 The Fifth Circuit, however, barred all same-sex sexual
harassment claims,3 and the Fourth Circuit disallowed claims in which both the
harasser and victim were heterosexuals of the same sex.
139
The question before the Court in Oncale was which of these interpretations of
the "because of ... sex"'140 language should be followed. The Court's choice
essentially was unconstrained by legislative history and statutory language. Although
all three circuit court interpretations contained flaws (amply discussed by the parties
and amici), all were plausible interpretations of Title VII, and the Court could have
chosen any one of the three without violating any evidence of congressional intent.
Oncale came before the Court after a panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. 4 ' The employee-
petitioner had worked on an offshore oil rig where he alleged he was subjected to
threats and acts of sexual abuse.
42
'3 See Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1283-84 (1991) ("[S]ex discrimination in private employment was forbidden under
federal law only in a last minute joking 'us boys' attempt to defeat Title VII's prohibition on
racial discrimination."). Even a recent revisionist attempt to argue that this position is
incorrect concedes the floor debate involved the sponsor of the amendment opposing the law
and a great deal of joking among the members. See Robert C. Bird, More Than a
Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 149-53 (1997).
136 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
13 See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996) (allowing a claim
by a male employee who repeatedly was subject to "bagging" by other employees, a process
in which other men grabbed and squeezed the victim's testicles).
138 See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
131 See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996).
140 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
141 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1000-01 (1998).
142 The Supreme Court opinion describes the alleged facts only in general terms "in the
interest of both brevity and dignity." Id at 1000. Briefly, other members of the oil rig crew
forcibly subjected Oncale to a series of humiliating, sexual acts. These allegedly included
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The employee-petitioner's arguments were straightforward. Title VII says
nothing about limiting the sex discrimination prohibition to persons of the opposite
sex; because the harassment alleged by Oncale was sexual in nature, his claim should
be covered by the statute. 43 On the other side, the employer made an equally
straightforward argument: No one in 1964 possibly could have imagined that same-
sex sexual harassment was within the scope of Title VII and, therefore, Oncale's
claim could not be covered., 44
In a brief, unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that
Title VII does not preclude actions in which both the alleged harasser and victim are
of the same sex. 4' The Court stressed that general limits on Title VII claims would
restrict the reach of its holding, emphasizing that conditions must be severe under a
reasonable person standard to support a sexual harassment claim.14
6
Three things are noteworthy about the Court's opinion. First, the Court
approached the issue as requiring it to determine whether there was a limitation either
in Title VII or its earlier opinions that precluded same-sex claims, rather than as
searching for a reason to include such claims.147 Given the legislative history of the
inclusion of sex as a prohibited ground for discrimination and the lack of statutory
language addressing any form of sexual harassment, it is clear, as the Court
acknowledged, that same-sex harassment was "not the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII."' 4 But because "it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislatures by which
we are governed," the Court concluded that intent was irrelevant.'49 The Court's
approach was thus classic Scalia-a simple reading of the statute was enough to
resolve the issue.
50
Second, the Court did not address any of the broader sex-related themes raised
in the legal literature and by several amici."'' Indeed, the Court seemed to go out of
another employee placing his penis on Oncale's neck and arm, threats of homosexual rape,
and forcing a bar of soap into Oncale's anus. See id at 1001; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996) rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
'4' See Petitioner's Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 458826, at *9-* 12.
See Respondent's Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634147, at *10-* 15.
"4'. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 100 1-02. Justice Thomas also filed a brief concurring opinion
emphasizing the limited nature of the holding. See id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring).
146 See id. at 1003.
141 See id at 1002 ("We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for
a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII.").
148 Id. at 1002.
149 Id.
"0 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 18-23 (1997) (describing
"textualism").
... See infra notes 254-61, 339-512 and accompanying text.
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its way to avoid the word "gender," which has become something of a code word for
a feminist theory-influenced approach to Title VII.
Third, the Court devoted almost a third of its short opinion to minimizing the
danger that its holding would "transform Title VII into a general civility code for the
American workplace."' 52 The Court argued that this concern, a prominent theme of
the employer'53 and one of its two amici,"" was misplaced because the risk of such
an impact "is no greater for same-sex than for opposite-sex harassment, and is
adequately met by careful attention to the requirements of the statute."' 5
B. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
Before Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher, courts interpreted Title VII to produce
liability for sexual harassment under two theories: quid pro quo and hostile
environment. Under the quid pro quo theory, an employee could bring a claim when
an employer demanded sexual acts in return for some benefit (i.e., a raise).'56 Under
the hostile environment theory, an employee could bring a claim when an employer's
actions created a change in the terms and conditions of employment.'57 For example,
an employee forced to endure constant sexual comments could bring a hostile work
environment claim.
Although not mentioned in the statute, these terms found their way into Title VII
jurisprudence in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 58 and numerous lower court
opinions. The lower courts were split, however, on how to deal with unfulfilled
sexual threats made by supervisors, as such claims did not appear to fit neatly into
either of the two categories.' 59 The Supreme Court therefore granted certiorari in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth60 to resolve the issue.
52Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
's See Respondent's Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634147, at *16-*22.
'14 See, e.g., EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634312, at *6 ("A contrary rule effectively
would convert Title VII from a focused mandate to end discrimination into an unmanageably
broad code of working behavior.").
s' Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
156 See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (noting plaintiff's
claim that she was denied admission to a police academy because she refused to have sexual
relations with her supervisor).
"' See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) ("'[A] requirement that
a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed
to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets."' (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982))).
"1 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
"9 See Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 307, 317-24.
160 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
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The employee in that case, Kimberly Ellerth, worked for Burlington Industries
for fifteen months, ending her employment in May 1994.16 She first worked as a
marketing assistant for roughly twelve months and then as a sales representative until
her resignation.'62 After Ellerth's resignation from Burlington, she wrote to her
supervisor alleging that she had resigned because Theodore Slowik, the vice
president in charge of her division, repeatedly had sexually harassed her.'63
Burlington successfully moved for summary judgment in the district court." On
appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
Ellerth had presented enough evidence to justify either a quid pro quo or hostile
environment claim.
65
The Seventh Circuit then granted rehearing en banc.'" On rehearing the Circuit
produced eight separate signed opinions following a diverse group of theories about
quid pro quo claims. A majority of the circuit judges found that Ellerth had waived
her hostile environment claim and Ellerth did not appeal the district court's judgment
on the constructive discharge claim. 167 The wide range of approaches used by the
judges of the en banc court mirrored the wide range of approaches to the issue taken
by the lower courts.
6
161 See id. at 2262.
162 See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1106 (N.D. I11. 1996), rev'd,
102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'dsub nom. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d
490 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc), aft'd, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
163 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2262. Briefly, Ellerth alleged that Slowik made repeated
inappropriate sexual comments to her (e.g. asking her if she was "practicing" in preparation
for starting a family), see Ellerth, 912 F. Supp. at 1106, inappropriately touched her (twice
on the knee and once on the buttocks), see id at 1107-08, and told her offensive sexual jokes,
see id at 1106-07. Ellerth alleged that Slowik hinted at a connection between her
receptiveness to his behavior and her career by telling her, for example, "'You know, Kim,
I could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington,"' Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2262, and
refusing to discuss a customer's request with her "'unless you want to tell me what you are
wearing."' Id. at 2262.
'" The district court found that Ellerth's failure to make use of Burlington's complaint
procedure foreclosed her constructive discharge claim. See Ellerth, 912 F. Supp. at 1124.
The district court also found that Ellerth could not prevail on a hostile work environment
claim because Burlington lacked knowledge of the alleged harassment. See id. at 1118.
Finally, the district court granted summary judgment on a quid pro quo theory, despite its
belief that Ellerth had not made a quid pro quo claim, on the ground that such claims require
actual adverse employment actions. See id. at 1121-23.
16' See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 1996).
166 See Jansen, 123 F.3d 490.
167 See id. at 492-95.
6' Three judges (in Ellerth) joined Judge Flaum in an opinion that held that an unfulfilled
threat was sufficient to violate Title VII because it altered the terms and conditions of
employment. See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 495-504 (Flaum, J., concurring). Five judges wrote
individually to disagree with the Flaum opinion. For purposes of this Article it is necessary
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Like Oncale, Ellerth presented the Court with a fundamental issue in interpreting
Title VII which the Court was free to resolve without many legislative history
constraints. The dilemma caused by the quid pro quo/hostile environment distinction
was a dilemma ultimately of the Court's own creation, as neither term has any basis
in the statute. Indeed, the underlying issue of the nature of sexual harassment claims
was itself the Court's own creation, because the statute does not mention sexual
harassment.
The employer-petitioner's legal position focused on maintaining the distinction
between quid pro quo and hostile environment theories.169 In contrast, the employee-
to note only Chief Judge Posner's opinion (joined by Judge Manion, who also wrote
separately), which suggested a "company acts" test to determine when an employer would
be strictly liable for employees' actions. Id at 506-17. Posner defined a "company act" as
one that "significantly alters the terms and conditions of employment of the victim of sexual
harassment." Id. at 515. Because companies could monitor such behavior, it would be
reasonable to make them strictly liable for it. See id
69 The argument had four main parts. First, the employer-petitioner argued, unfulfilled
threats were categorized properly as hostile environment claims because the definition of
quid pro quo harassment requires, as a matter of logic, that there be both a quid and a quo.
See Petitioner's Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 90827, at *16-*21. Arguments from logic and
citations to law review articles analyzing the quid pro quo theory, but not by case authority
or legislative history, supported this theory. See id. at * 18 (quoting and citing J. Hoult
Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273 (1995)).
The employer-petitioner next argued that a strict liability standard for unfulfilled threats
would be ineffective and unfair to employers because employers would not know the conduct
was occurring. See id at *21 -*26. During the employer-petitioner's argument, the justices
repeatedly challenged the attorney to explain how his arguments related to the question on
which the Court had granted certiorari instead of a question on which the Court had not
granted the petition. See Oral Argument, Ellerth, 1998 WL 202275, at *3-*30. This
questioning, which consumed the entire time allotted to petitioner, ended with the question:
"Why-why should that be? Why-why should that be? Why should there be a distinction
between quid pro quo and hostile work environment? What is the law trying to achieve by
adopting that category-by adopting that dichotomy?" Id. at *29. In questioning the
employee-respondent's attorney, the Court's questions often struck a similar theme, focusing
on the utility and rationale for the quid pro quo/hostile environment distinction. See id. at
*30-*43. Again, the argument proceeded largely from logic, with a few citations to cases for
general principles. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 90827, at *24 ("Generally,
strict liability is applied when a person stands in a unique position to prevent a foreseeable
harm to another." (citations omitted)). Third, the employer-petitioner argued that lower
court's "expansion" of quid pro quo doctrine to unfulfilled threats is contrary to both the
Supreme Court's discussion of the appropriate scope of vicarious liability under Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), and to the principles of the common law
of agency. SeePetitioner's Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 90827, at *26-*30. This argument was
a straightforward discussion of Restatement (Second) of Agency sections 219(1) and
219(2)(d). See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219(1), 2(d) (1959). Both of these
sections received thorough analysis by the parties and amici in Faragher. To make its
argument here, the employer-petitioner turned to a discussion of Title VII precedents as well
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respondent opened her brief by denying that quid pro quo and hostile environment
claims are separate and distinct: "The very language of the Question Presented posed
by petitioner reflects a fundamental misconception regarding the nature of Title
VII."'170 Because the statute itself makes no reference to these theories, sexual
harassment claims simply must meet the same statutory requirements as other
claims-i.e., they must involve discrimination based on a prohibited ground, the
discrimination must affect the plaintiff's "compensation, terms, conditions, or




In an opinion by Justice Kennedy,' a six-justice majority of the Supreme Court
set out a new rule for employer liability for supervisory acts. The majority began by
recognizing that the distinction between the quid pro quo and hostile environment
doctrines was "helpful, perhaps in making a rough demarcation between cases in
which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are absent altogether,
as the Restatement. Finally, the employer-petitioner argued that a majority of the circuits had
adopted a position that precluded application of quid pro quo doctrine to unfulfilled threats.
See Petitioner's Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 90827, at *31-35.
170 Respondent's Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145325, at * 11.
'7' Id. at * I 1-* 12 (citing and quoting the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1994)). This
argument had five main parts. First, the employee-respondent argued that sexual harassment
by a supervisor is an action by the employer in which the harassing supervisor uses or is
aided by his supervisory powers. See id. at * 14-*25. This portion of the argument centered
on an extended discussion of the "state action" doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment
because those cases "provide an established and familiar body of caselaw to which the courts
should look in determining when the action of a supervisor or other worker is 'employer'
action." Id. at * 17. Second, the employee-respondent argued that even unrealized threats
constitute employer action. See id at *25-*28. Again the brief resorted to creative analogies
to make its argument. For example, the brief looked to criminal law cases involving the issue
of whether a bank robber who brandishes but does not fire a weapon should receive an
enhanced sentence for "using" a firearm. See id. at *26. Similarly, the brief compared the
employer's position to the "long discredited doctrine that proof of rape requires evidence that
the victim had put up a sufficiently vigorous physical defense to sustain demonstrable
injuries." Id. at *27. Third, the employee-respondent argued that abuses of official power are
employer action regardless of whether they produce "tangible" harm. See id at *28-*31. This
argument was built on logic, with the essence of the argument being that Title VII did not
include such a distinction in the statute's language. See id. at *30. Fourth, the employee-
respondent argued that adoption of an anti-harassment policy would be insufficient to
preclude liability on its own. See id. at *32-*42. Largely an argument from logic, this section
of the brief also responded to arguments made by the pro-employer amici. See id. at *38-*39.
Somewhat oddly, the brief also raised the issue of the sexual harassment charges against
Sergeant Major of the Army Gene McKinney, going so far as to include a National Public
Radio transcript as an appendix to the brief. See id at *39-*40. Finally, the brief argued that
summary judgment was inappropriate because material fact issues remained. See id at *42-
*44.
'72 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
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but beyond this are of limited utility."' 73 After defending its vague articulation of the
terms in Meritor,74 the Court criticized the subsequent developments in the lower
courts.' 7 In particular, the Court noted that the lower courts' use of the terms
"encouraged Title VII plaintiffs to state their claims as quidpro quo claims, which
in turn put expansive pressure on the definition."'76 The Court then examined how
unfulfilled threats fit within the hostile environment claim.
The Court found that "something more" than the supervisor's employment
relationship was necessary because "[i]n a sense, most workplace tortfeasors are
aided in accomplishing their tortious objective by the existence of the agency
relation."'77 To define that "something," the Court turned to the concept of a
"tangible employment action," as discussed by Chief Judge Posner in his opinion
below, and found that, when supervisors take such actions, the employer is
vicariously liable.'78 Adopting much of Judge Posner's rationale, the Court justified
this vicarious liability by noting that such "company acts" depended both on the
delegation of authority to the supervisor and characterization as official acts of the
employer.'79
The Court went further than Judge Posner, however, by holding that harassment
that does not culminate in a tangible employment action can be a violation of Title
VII.' Despite acknowledging there was "much confusion" among the lower courts
about how to apply agency rules in these type of cases,' the Court declined to create
a clear rule.8 2 Instead, it created a vaguely defined affirmative defense for employers
consisting of two elements: reasonable care in preventing and promptly correcting
sexual harassment and unreasonable failure by the plaintiff to take advantage of
preventive or corrective policies.' Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment and
the new rule' 84
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented in an opinion authored by Justice
Thomas.' The dissenters criticized the majority opinion for "barely" attempting to
SId. at 2264.
174 See id. ("In Meritor, the terms served a specific and limited purpose.").
'71 See id. at 2264-65.
176 Id. at 2265.
177 Id. at 2268.
171 Id. at 2268-70.
179 See id. at 2269-70.
"So See id. at 2269.
181 Id.
'82 See id ("The aided in the agency relation standard, however, is a developing feature
of agency law, and we hesitate to render a definitive explanation of our understanding of the
standard in an area where other important considerations must affect our judgment.").
"83 See id. at 2270.
184 See id. at 2271 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
185 See id. at 2271-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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define the new rule,"8 6 for a "whole-cloth creation that draws no support from the
legal principles on which the Court claims it is based,"' 7 and for "willful
policymaking."' 8 The dissenters followed Chief Judge Posner's analysis from the
opinions below relatively closely, citing it in several places.'89
C. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
In Faragher, the Supreme Court addressed the question of when an employer can
be held indirectly liable for hostile environment sexual harassment by a supervisor,
a question left unresolved by its 1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson.'9 ° As the Court noted, the "Courts of Appeals have struggled to derive
manageable standards to govern employer liability for hostile environment
harassment perpetrated by supervisory employees. While following our admonition
to find guidance in the common law of agency, as embodied in the Restatement, the
Courts of Appeals have adopted different approaches."'' The problem the Court
faced in Faragher ultimately was a statutory interpretation question made more
difficult by Congress' failure to provide any evidence that it had considered the issue
of employer liability for supervisory acts.
The primary statutory feature that demanded attention was the statute's use of the
word "agent" in defining the word "employer."' 92 The Supreme Court's earlier
refusal to give much guidance in Meritor, and its cryptic statements in that opinion
about the role of the common law of agency, left the lower courts, the parties, and the
amici struggling to find a conceptual anchor for their various approaches. Thus,
although the question presented was one of statutory interpretation, it also was one
in which the Supreme Court again had enormous freedom of action due to the
vagueness of the statute and the Meritor opinion.
Beth Ann Faragher worked part-time as a lifeguard for the city of Boca Raton,
Florida ("the City") from 1985 to 1990.'9' After resigning her position to attend law
school, Faragher sued the City and two of her immediate supervisors, Bill Terry and
David Silverman, alleging that Terry and Silverman had created a "'sexually hostile
atmosphere' ... by repeatedly subjecting Faragher and other female lifeguards to
'uninvited and offensive touching,' by making lewd remarks, and by speaking of
women in offensive terms."'94 For example, Faragher alleged that Silverman told her
186 Id. at 2271 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 2273 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 2272-73 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
'90 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
91 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (1998).
192 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).




to "Date me or clean the toilets for a year."'"5 Both Terry and Silverman engaged in
extensive crude and offensive conduct with the relatively few female lifeguards (four
to six out of forty to fifty lifeguards). 96
The issue of liability for supervisory conduct was highlighted in this case because
Boca Raton's lifeguards worked in a "paramilitary configuration"--a chain of
command in which lifeguards reported to lieutenants and captains (including
Silverman), who themselves reported to the Chief of the Marine Safety Division
(Terry).' 97 Moreover, "[t]he lifeguards had no significant contact with higher city
officials."'98
The facts also highlighted another crucial issue-the impact of employer efforts
to control supervisory behavior. The City had a sexual harassment policy, which had
been adopted in February 1986 and revised in May 1990.'99 Many Marine Safety
Section employees, including Terry, Silverman, and other lifeguards, were unaware
of the policy, however, because it had not been circulated adequately. 00 Further,
important questions remained as to whether the employer could be liable if the
harassed employee did not report the offensive conduct. Faragher never had
complained to a city official with authority over Terry or Silverman about the
behavior of the two men.2' The City first learned of the problem when, two months
95 Id.
196 See id. at 2281. For example:
Terry repeatedly touched the bodies of female employees without invitation,
would put his arm around Faragher, with his hand on her buttocks, and once
made contact with another female lifeguard in a motion of sexual stimulation. He
made crudely demeaning references to women generally, and once commented
disparagingly on Faragher's shape. During a job interview with a woman he
hired as a lifeguard, Terry said that the female lifeguards had sex with their male
counterparts and asked whether she would do the same.
Silverman behaved in similar ways. He once tackled Faragher and
remarked that, but for a physical characteristic he found unattractive, he would
readily have had sexual relations with her. Another time, he pantomimed an act
of oral sex. Within earshot of the female lifeguards, Silverman made frequent,
vulgar references to women and sexual matters, commented on the bodies of
female lifeguards and beachgoers, and at least twice told female lifeguards that
he would. like to engage in sex with them.
Id (citations omitted).
9 See id. at 2280.
198 Id The lifeguards worked out of"a small one-story building containing an office, a
meeting room, and a single, unisex locker room with a shower." Id. It was located at the
beach, away from city hall. See id.
199 See id.
200 See id at 2280-81.
201 See id. at 2281. She did speak with Robert Gordon, a lieutenant (and later captain), but
regarded those comments not as a formal complaint, "but as conversations with a person she
held in high esteem." Id. Gordon did not report the conversations. See id.
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before Faragher resigned, a former lifeguard wrote to the City Personnel Director,
Richard Bender, and complained about Terry and Silverman." 2 Following an
investigation, the City reprimanded Terry and Silverman, requiring them to choose
between a forfeiture of annual leave or a suspension without pay.2"3
Faragher prevailed on her Title VII claims in the district court in a bench trial.2"4
The court found that Terry's and Silverman's conduct was serious enough to
constitute an abusive working environment. 5 Turning to the question of the City's
liability, the district court put forth three justifications fbr holding the City liable for
the conduct of Terry and Silverman: (1) the pervasiveness of the conduct;20 6 (2)
traditional agency principles;20 7 and (3) imputed knowledge to the City resulting from
the combination of knowledge of the harassment by someone between the supervisors
and Faragher in the chain of command, and the inaction of that individual.2 ' Based
on these three theories, the district court awarded Faragher one dollar in nominal
damages.0 9
On appeal, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed.2"0 The panel agreed that
Terry's and Silverman's conduct created an "objectively abusive work
environment,1211 but rejected the district court's conclusion that the City was liable
for their behavior.1 On rehearing en banc, the full Eleventh Circuit adopted the
panel's conclusion by a seven-to-five vote.2t3 The Supreme Court then granted
certiorari.214
The employee-petitioner urged the Court to adopt two theories of employer
liability for supervisory conduct.2"5 First, the employee-petitioner argued that
Restatement (Second) ofAgency section 219(2)(d) provided an appropriate means for
202 See id
203 See id.
204 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1994). Faragher obtained
substantial relief on her other theories as well. See id. at 1568 (awarding $10,000 in
compensatory damages and $500 in punitive damages to Faragher and $35,000 in
compensatory damages and $2,000 in punitive damages to the other plaintiff, Nancy
Ewanchew).
205 See id. at 1562-63.
206 See id. at 1563.
207 See id. at 1563-64.
208 See id. at 1564.
209 See id. at 1568.
20 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155 (11 th Cir. 1996).
211 Id. at 1]62.
212 See id. at 1164-65.
213 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, Ill F.3d 1530 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
214 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997).
25 This Article does not address the Petitioner's Reply Brief, 1998 WL 66037, in detail
because the rebuttal arguments are not of interest in comparing the amici with the parties.
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evaluating employer liability.216 Second, the employee-petitioner urged that the
employer's "knowledge, both actual and constructive," would create liability.217 At
the Supreme Court, Faragher's legal team included a lawyer from the National
Organization for Women's Legal Defense Fund, an organization which regularly
participates as amicus in other Title VII cases and which was part of the feminist
coalition in the other cases analyzed in this Article.
In addition to arguing for the straightforward application of the Restatement test,
the petitioner's brief included a substantial section devoted tojustifying the analysis
based on the structure of harassment. To do so, the brief first analogized
216 Petitioner's Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 793076, at *19. The Restatement-based
argument was almost entirely an argument from logic. After restating the Restatement
provision in terms applicable to sexual harassment cases, the brief argued that "[i]n many
cases, as here, the supervisor's powers over the terms and conditions of the victim's
employment will facilitate that harassment because the victim reasonably believes that she
is' at risk of retaliation if she resists, objects to or complains about that harassment." Id. at
*21. To avoid turning the standard into strict liability, the employee-petitioner argued that
the issue of whether the supervisor is aided in the harassment by his or her authority "is
obviously a factual question to be addressed in light of the record in each specific case." Id.
at *21-22. While a host of specific factors, such as the nature of the supervisory powers and
the "proven efficacy of any anti-harassment program," would play a role in resolving this
question, "[iun most cases, the question of fact will be whether the supervisor was aided in
perpetrating the harassment by a reasonable fear on the part of the victim that she would face
retaliation if she resisted, objected or complained to others." Id. at *22. Applied to the record
in this case, the employee-petitioner contended that this test was satisfied. See id. at *29-*30.
27 Id. at *30. The brief set out three ways in which the employer in this case had
knowledge of the harassment. First, the employees had reported the harassment to Robert
Gordon, another supervisor, and by imputing his knowledge to the city, the employer had
actual knowledge. See id at *30-*34. Second, the employer had constructive knowledge
based on the pervasiveness of the conduct. See id. at *34-*36. Third, the employer had
"constructive knowledge based on the absence of an effective policing mechanism." Id. at
*36-*41.
The briefs actual knowledge argument was straightforward: Gordon knew of the
harassment, Gordon was a supervisor, and so the employer therefore had knowledge. See id.
at *3 1-*32. In response to the Eleventh Circuit's "higher management" test, the brief merely
noted that "[n]othing in agency law, however, requires notice only to 'higher management;'
the most that is required is that the knowledge be on the part of someone with an obligation
to act on that knowledge." Id at *3 1-*32. As supporting authority, the brief cited and briefly
discussed an EEOC Policy Guideline, a Restatement comment, and a Title VII case. See id.
at *32.
The brief devoted much less attention to the constructive notice claims. In making the
pervasiveness constructive notice claim, the brief focused on recasting the issue as a factual
question on which deference was due to the district court. See id. at *35-*36. In making the
effective policing constructive notice claim, the brief largely quoted from a dissent below,
see id. at *40-*41, and cited a series of academic and popular press articles on sexual
harassment as evidence of the extent of the problem. See id. at *37 n.49.
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environmental sexual harassment with quid pro quo harassment. For example, the
brief noted:
If the supervisors in this case had threatened to dismiss Petitioner unless
she permitted them to touch her buttocks or breasts, or to make crude
remarks to her, that would have constituted quid pro quo sexual
harassment, whether she had obeyed or had been fired for resisting.
Hostile work environment cases involving supervisors differ from
ordinary quid pro quo cases primarily in the explicitness with which the
harassing supervisor exploits his supervisory power over the victim. 18
The brief then gave an extended description of the sexual harassment theory,
presenting it as "aided by the same victim fears as those triggered by explicit quid pro
quo threats." '219 After describing the "broad discretionary powers" of supervisors in-
general, the brief then set forth the heart of its argument about supervisory power:
Sexual harassment is about power-the power of a harassing supervisor
to inflict on a female subordinate conduct that he could not impose on any
unwilling woman outside of the employment context. That power arises
precisely because such a perpetrator is "aided in accomplishing the
[harassment] by the existence of" his powers as a supervisor.
Indeed, the disproportionately large number of sexual harassment
incidents involving supervisors reflects this critical aspect of the
relationship between supervisors and subordinates.... The virtual non-
existence of cases in which subordinates sexually harass their superiors
reflects the fact that the actual or potential exercise of supervisory powers
by the harassing supervisor often lies at the very heart of this
misconduct.22°
As support for these statements the brief cited both the facts of Title VII cases and
other anecdotal materials.2 '
218 Id. at *23-*24 (footnotes omitted).
2I9 d. at *24.
220 Id. at *25-*26 (footnotes omitted).
22 See id. at *25-*26 nn.26-3 1.
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The employer-respondent's brief contained three main arguments:222 the
application of agency principles proposed by the employee-petitioner would lead to
the equivalent of strict liability for employers, a result inconsistent with the holding
in Meritor;23 a negligence standard is the appropriate standard for evaluating
employer conduct;12 and, even if the negligence standard were applied, the
employee-petitioner's rules would not result in liability.
225
This brief made a different type of argument from, and relied on a different set
of authorities than, the employee-petitioner's brief. Instead of focusing on the nature
of the workplace and its relationship to sexual harassment, the employer-respondent
devoted most of its analysis to an evaluation of pre-Title VII agency cases involving
facts similar to those in sexual harassment cases. For example, the brief argued that
"a proper application of agency principles to-Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment should look to common law treatment of intentional or 'wanton' torts,
particularly those that involve unwelcome touching or verbal abuse of a sexual
nature.,,226 From these cases, the brief drew the principle that such conduct is outside
the scope of employment and, hence, not a basis for employer liability.227 Even when
courts did impose liability for similar conduct, the principle relied upon suggests "at
most ... a possible basis for vicarious liability in cases of quid pro quo sexual
harassment, in which a supervisor's harassment is directly linked with the
supervisor's performance of his assigned duties .... . 22' Similarly, in arguing that
the common law concept of apparent authority was not appropriate for analysis of
sexual harassment cases, the brief relied on non-Title VII authority drawn from
agency law to illustrate the principles and demonstrate that they did not fit the
circumstances of Title VII cases.229
In short, the employer-respondent's brief made an argument, primarily based on
traditional legal authorities (i.e., case law and treatises), for selecting certain common
law agency principles to import into Title VII. The brief rarely relied on policy
22 The brief also set out a version of the facts that concentrated on minimizing the
seriousness of the harassing conduct. See Respondent's Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32487,
at *3, *2-*9 (noting that the employee-petitioner worked with the alleged harassers during
her entire tenure, that she contacted one of them seeking to return to work at the beach, that
she did not discuss sexual harassment with a female friend who was a lifeguard, and that she
did not discourage her sister from applying for a job at the beach).
223 See id. at* 19-*35.
224 See id. at *35-*41.
225 See id. at *41-*50.
226 Id. at *23.
227 See id. at *24.
221 Id. at *25.
229 See id at *29-*30 ("The common-law agency principle of 'apparent authority' was not
meant to apply to evident intentional torts that are unrelated to the agent's responsibilities,
and it should not now be utilized for a purpose that was never intended.").
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arguments23° or assertions about either the structure of the workplace or the nature of
sexual harassment. In the oral argument, however, the Court transformed this
position into a policy argument."'
As it did in all three cases discussed in this Article, the government participated
in Faragher as an amicus.232 The EEOC took the position that employers are liable
"when a supervisor is aided in the harassment by his agency relationship or when the
employer knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take
appropriate corrective action."233
230 An exception was the secondary argument that a negligence standard for employer
knowledge "comports with the remedial goals of Title VII." Id at *38.
23 The exchanges with the employer-respondent's attorney centered on pressing him to
articulate the distinction that would place a racially motivated hiring decision within the
scope of employment and the supervisors' conduct in this case outside it. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, Faragher, 1998 WL 146704, *25-*54. After a number of questions on the
issue from several members of the Court, the following exchange occurred, which captures
the result of the questioning:
QUESTION: Can-can you say what-what harm do you do to the fabric of the
law-and I'm not saying you don't-but what harm do you do if you say
the-the policing of the environment, the policing of the work environment for
a high level supervisor, is precisely analogous to hiring and firing in respect to
a hirer? And if you do the hiring wrong, even for personal motives, the company
is liable because the hiring/firing decision is the company. And if you do the
policing of the environment wrong, your company is liable, because the policing
of the environment is a company responsibility. I think that's what Justice
Stevens and everybody has been trying to get at-I think. And-and you're
saying, Well, that would be somewhat novel. But there is an analogy, I take it,
in the asbestos area. And is there other harm that would be occurring if-if-I
mean, is-would the law be hurt? Is that very novel? Is it contrary to other? You
'see what I'm-I'm trying to get a-
MR. RISSETTO: We believe the objectives of Title VII would be hurt.
QUESTION: And that's because of your policy argument.... is that a problem
with the liability assessment? Or is it a problem with the substantive standard?
MR. RISSETTO: I-I think it's related to the problem of liability, as a practical
matter.
Id. at *48-*49. Thus, at least in oral argument, the Court reduced the relatively textured legal
argument presented in the employer-respondent's brief to a policy argument. This policy
argument, moreover, was one the employer-respondent would have difficulty winning
because the "bad" outcome of employees lying in wait to bring suits was, as one justice put
it, "Then you sue and you recover $1." Id at *50. That the events in this case occurred prior
to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was what precluded punitive damages in this case, making
subsequent cases potentially more serious.
232 The EEOC also participated in the en banc panel below as an amicus. See Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, I l1 F.3d 1530, 1532 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
233 EEOC Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 799997, at *12.
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By a seven-to-two majority, the Supreme Court overturned the Eleventh Circuit
opinion and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the employee-petitioner."'
In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court analyzed two of the three theories of
employer liability rejected by the Eleventh Circuit, finding it had no need to consider
the claim that the employer was liable by virtue of its knowledge of the harassment. 35
The majority rejected the argument for employer liability (which was based on
Restatement section 219(1)) that the harassing supervisors were acting within the
scope of their employment. After noting that most of the lower courts had agreed
that "harassment consisting of unwelcome remarks and touching is motivated solely
by individual desires and serves no purpose of the employer,, 236 the Court
acknowledged that "[t]hese cases ostensibly stand in some tension with others arising
outside Title VII, in which the scope of employment has been defined broadly
enough to hold employers vicariously liable for intentional torts that were in no sense
inspired by any purpose to serve the employer.
237
The majority found that this tension was more apparent than real, concluding that
the key to understanding the scope of employment cases generally was not "a
mechanical application of indefinite and malleable factors set forth in the
Restatement, but rather an inquiry into the reasons that would support a conclusion
that harassing behavior ought to be held within the scope of a supervisor's
employment, and the reasons for the opposite view. '238 Although the majority
conceded that a case could be made for finding that the harassment was within the
supervisors' scope of employment because of the pervasiveness of sexual harassment
in the workplace, the majority rejected this rationale for two reasons. "First, there is
no reason to suppose that Congress wished courts to ignore the traditional distinction
between acts falling within the scope and acts amounting to what the older law called
frolics or detours from the course of employment., 239 Second, making the employer
liable on this theory would call into question a well-established body of court of
appeals case law holding that employers were not liable for coworkers' harassing
behavior.240 Because the same rationale would apply to making employers liable for
acts of both supervisors and coworkers, the majority concluded that "[i]t is quite
unlikely that these cases would escape efforts to render them obsolete if we were to
hold that supervisors who engage in discriminatory harassment are necessarily acting
within the scope of their employment."24 '
234 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2294 (1998).
235 See id.
236 Id. at 2286-87.
237 Id. at 2287.
231 Id. at 2288.
239 id.
240 See id.
241 Id. at 2289.
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The Court next turned to the argument that, based on Restatement section
219(2)(d), employers could be held liable because the authority granted to the
supervisor by his employer facilitated the supervisor's harassing behavior. The
majority agreed with the employee-petitioner:
[I]n implementing Title VII it makes sense to hold an employer
vicariously liable for some tortious conduct of a supervisor made possible
by abuse of his supervisory authority, and that the aided-by-agency
relation principle embodied in section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement
provides an appropriate starting point for determining liability for the kind
of harassment presented here.242
The application of section 219(2)(d) was limited, the majority found, by the
Court's rejection in Meritor of "automatic" liability for employers.243 The Faragher
majority considered two ways to reconcile section 219(2)(d) with the holding in
Meritor: "requiring proof of some affirmative invocation of that authority by the
harassing supervisor" and recognizing "an affirmative defense to liability in some
circumstances."24 The majority rejected the former as leading to a "temptation to
litigate" and conflicting results.245 Instead, the Court created an affirmative defense
"that the employer had exercised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to
eliminate it when it might occur, and that the complaining employee had failed to act
with like reasonable care to take advantage of the employer's safeguards and
otherwise prevent harm that could have been avoided. 246
Applying its newly-created analysis, the majority in Faragher found that the
record supported a judgment against the employer. The supervisors had sufficient
authority over the lifeguards to meet the requirements of the new test. Moreover, the
City was foreclosed from raising an affirmative defense because of its failure to
disseminate its sexual harassment policy to the supervisors and lifeguards.247
242 Id. at 2290.
243 See id. at 2291.
244 Id.
241 Id. at 2292.
246 Id.
247 See id. at 2293.
Unlike the employer of a small workforce, who might expect that sufficient care
to prevent tortious behavior could be exercised informally, those responsible for
city operations could not reasonably have thought that precautions against hostile
environments in any one of many departments in far-flung locations could be
effective without communicating some formal policy against harassment, with
a sensible complaint procedure.
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Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in a brief opinion by Justice Thomas,24
which reiterated his dissent from Ellerth.249 In addition to repeating his conclusion
from Ellerth that "absent an adverse employment consequence, an employer cannot
be held vicariously liable if a supervisor creates a hostile work environment,
250
Justice Thomas also criticized the majority for not remanding the case on the
negligence issue because "the District Court made no finding as to the City's
negligence, and the Court of Appeals did not directly consider the issue. '251
IV. POSITIONS
The amici's positions provide a good starting point for examining their
contributions to Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher. Anecdotal evidence from other cases
suggests that amici sometimes have an influence on the Court's decisions.2 52 Amici's
positions can add something entirely new to a case. Ivers and O'Connor, for
example, found that one of the amici they studied sometimes went beyond the goals
of the party whose position the amicus supported to ask the Court to reconsider or
modify earlier decisions.253
The positions available to the amici differed significantly in each of the three
cases. In Oncale, the positions were limited by the narrow scope of the possible
outcomes: same-sex sexual harassment either was covered or it was not, with
relatively little room for a more nuanced position. In Faragher and Ellerth, however,
there were so many possible positions on the key issues that the amici could, and did,
adopt quite different rationales even when reaching similar conclusions.
A. Oncale
The two "business" amici (the EEAC and the TAB&CC) took identical
positions, arguing (as expected) that same-sex sexual harassment simply was not




252 See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 3, at 607; Susan Hedman, Friends of the Earth and Friends
of the Court: Assessing the Impact of Interest Group Amici Curiae in Environmental Cases
Decided By The Supreme Court, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 193-97 (1991); Ivers & O'Connor,
supra note 3, at 169-70 (finding that arguments advanced by two amici in criminal cases
frequently were adopted in majority and dissenting opinions); Leo Pfeffer, Amicus in
Church-State Litigation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1981).
253 See Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 3, at 171.
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covered by Title VII. 254 The most remarkable feature of the positions taken in these
briefs is the lack of participation by amici on the employer's side.
The five employee-side amici briefs contained a slightly more varied set of
positions. The NELA and the ATLA argued that Title VII covered same-sex sexual
harassment regardless of the sexual orientation of the individuals involved. 2" The
legal position of the MacKinnon Coalition brief also was that Title VII should cover
same-sex sexual harassment.256 Its position went beyond the legal issue, however,
by advocating a distinctive view of sexual harassment as well. 257 The twenty-nine
law professors argued that Title VII covered "same[-]sex sexual harassment," and so
the case should be remanded for further factual development. 258 Finally, the coalition
of eleven gay rights, feminist, and civil liberties groups led by the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund filed a brief arguing that Title VII covered same-sex
sexual harassment. It also argued that Oncale was an inappropriate case in which to
consider whether Title VII's ban on sex discrimination has implications for sexual
orientation discrimination.2 9
The Court's decision in Oncale appears to have little or nothing to do with the
positions taken by the amici. The Court adhered to the language of Title VII in its
brief opinion and found that the acts alleged in the case fit within the "because... of
sex" language.26 The Court not only did not discuss the broader theories, like those
advanced by the MacKinnon Coalition, but also did not even use the term "gender."
(A key component of such theories lies in differentiating "sex" and "gender." '261)
B. Ellerth
The amici's positions in Ellerth were far more complicated and are harder to
summarize than those in Oncale. Two employee-side amici, the NELA and the AFL-
CIO, argued in slightly different ways that this particular case was a bad one in which
to decide the issue in question.262 On the merits, however, despite the general
254 See EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634312, at *1 1-* 16; TAB&CC Brief, Oncale,
1997 WL 673838, at *1.
255 See NELA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 458806, at *4; ATLA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL
453675, at *2-*3.
256 See MacKinnon Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 4.7814, at *4-*5.
257 See infra notes 314-15.
258 Law Professors' Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 531305, at *2.
259 See Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471805, at *25 n.19.
260 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
261 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality?, 57 FORDHAM L.
REV. 941, 946-49 (1989) (distinguishing the terms "sex" and "gender").
262 See NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353, at *2, *6-*8 (arguing that the writ should
be dismissed as improvidently granted); AFL-CIO Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145348, at *4-
* 14 (arguing that the "Question Presented" by the Petitioner was irrelevant to the outcome
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agreement among all four briefs that employers had broad liability for supervisory
sexual harassment, they emphasized quite different ways of achieving that outcome.
On the fundamental question of what to do about the quid pro quo/hostile
environment dichotomy, for example, the four employee-side amici took quite
different positions. The NELA and the feminist coalition accepted the two categories
and focused their arguments on why unfulfilled threats qualified as quid pro quo
harassment.263 The AFL-CIO and the Rutherford Institute, on the other hand,
advocated new approaches to supervisory liability that transcended or ignored the
dichotomy.26 Finally, the AFL-CIO devoted considerable effort to an argument that
the "company act" doctrine proposed by Judge Posner, in his opinion in the en banc
proceeding below, was particularly inappropriate.265
On the employer side, the two amici similarly were divided about the appropriate
route to a common outcome. Both employer-side amici agreed that employers should
have a defense based on the existence of sexual harassment policies." The EEAC
position was straightforward:
Quid pro quo harassment by definition requires that a tangible job
detriment or benefit be conditioned on the grant or denial of sexual
favors. If either the quid or the quo is missing, sex-based conduct is not
actionable unless it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a
hostile environment.267
The CCUS brief, on the other hand, argued that the en banc Seventh Circuit's
and other lower courts' "inflexible categorization" of sexual harassment cases into
of the case).
263 See NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353, *2, *6-*12; ERA/NOWLDEF/
NPW&F/NWLC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145349, at *3-*8. The NELA also argued that
economic effects were not necessary for the existence of quid pro quo harassment. See NELA
Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353, at *2, * 12-*21. The feminists also argued that employers
are liable for all forms of discrimination by supervisors. See ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/
NWLC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145349, at *8-*27.
264 See AFL-CIO Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145348, * 18, * 14-*21 (arguing that employers
should be liable for supervisory acts under what it termed a "modem 'scope of authority'
approach"); Rutherford Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 151471, at *4-*5 (arguing in favor of a strict
liability standard for quid pro quo harassment, even absent tangible job detriment). The
Institute's position was exactly the same as its position in the Paula Jones case.
265 See AFL-CIO Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145348, at *22-*30.
266 See EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294, at *7 (arguing that an employee's failure
to "take advantage of a well-communicated express policy against sexual harassment and an
adequate procedure for resolving claims" should shield an employer from liability); CCUS
Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296, at *23 (stating that an employer should be liable only if it
knew or should have known about the conduct).
26 EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294, at *7.
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quid pro quo and hostile environment categories created "an unnecessary
quandary." '268 Although assuming, for the purposes of the brief, that the
categorization generally was valid,269 the CCUS argued that unfulfilled threats require
categorization as "a hybrid form of harassment, with aspects of both categories." 7'
C. Faragher
The employee-side amici split in Faragher on the appropriate standard for
determining employer liability. The NELA took what it characterized as a "middle
ground"27' on the issue of supervisory liability, arguing that "employers may be
vicariously liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment perpetrated by
their supervisors." '72  It argued vicarious liability should include liability for
harassment committed within the supervisors' scope of employment, for when the
employer/supervisor relationship aided the supervisor in carrying out the harassment,
and for when the supervisor acted with apparent authority.2" The NELA also
advocated the need for extensive development of the record in this type of case.274
The NWLC/ERA/WLDF brief argued that the key to application of agency law
principles to Title VII was the supervisor's use of the employer's authority
"implicitly or explicitly" to conduct the harassment.275
The Lawyers' Committee/ACLU brief asserted two main arguments. First, it
took a different approach to the application of agency principles, emphasizing that
Gordon's knowledge of the harassment and Terry and Silverman's knowledge of
their own behavior was enough to justify imposing liability on the employer. 76
268 CCUS Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296, at *7.
269 See id. at *8 n.4.
270 Id. at *8. In this hybrid category,
[a]n unfulfilled threat should be actionable, even if it constitutes an isolated
incident, where the facts demonstrate that the threat was sufficiently severe or
egregious to alter the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment. But as
with other sexual misconduct that does not involve tangible job consequences,
an employer should be liable for an unfulfilled threat only if negligent, i.e., only
if it knew or should have known of the threat, and failed to take prompt remedial
action.
Id.
27' NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180, at *5.
272 Id. at *6.
273 See id at * 1-* 13.
274 See id at * 11 (noting that a cited fact from this case "is precisely the type of empirical
fact that is uncovered by a searching exam of the real life functioning of this city which is the
methodology NELA advocates").
275 NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800075, at *5.




Second, the Lawyers' Committee/ACLU brief attacked the Eleventh Circuit's
"higher management" notification requirement as inconsistent with Title VII. 77 In
addition, the Lawyers' Committee/ACLU briefly argued that liability also was
justified under the "aided by" analysis278 and that constructive notice could not be
prevented by the "remoteness" of the work site from the employer's headquarters.279
The AFL-CIO advocated a position centered on Justice Stevens's concurring
opinion in Meritor.2" The AFL-CIO contended that when the common law of
agency was "clear and uniform," Congress intended to follow it in applying Title VII.
When the common law was not clear, however, "the better course is to consider the
issue as a matter of Title VII substantive law." '' The solution under Title VII,
according to the AFL-CIO brief, was to make employers liable for supervisory sexual
harassment under the same standard as used to evaluate employers' liability in other
areas of Title VII. 2
82
The employer-side amici naturally had different ideas about employer liability.
What is most interesting is that, like the employee-side amici, they split on how to
implement similar policy goals. The EEAC's argument centered on the narrow
application of agency principles to determine employer liability for a supervisor's
acts.283 The CCUS position was that the Restatement (Second) ofAgency was an
inadequate basis for determining employer liability for supervisory harassment, and
that the Court therefore must develop agency principles that "comport with
Congress's twin objectives of deterring sexual harassment and providing
compensation to victims."2 The principle suggested by the CCUS was a negligence
approach, holding employers liable "if and only if [the employer] knew or should
have known of the harassment but failed to take prompt remedial action."28 5 The
SHRM's position primarily was one of opposition to the employee-petitioner's
proposed rule. Although the SHRM brief concluded by requesting an affirmation of
the Eleventh Circuit en banc decision, the brief rarely mentioned the specifics of the
277 Id. at *18.
278 Id. at *28-*29.
279 Id. at *29.
280 See AFL-CIO Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 799994, at *3-*4.
281 Id. at *5.
282 See id.
283 See EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *7. First, the EEAC contended,
employers should not be liable unless the supervisor used actual or apparent authority to
harass or the employer was on notice of the harassment. See id. Second, these circumstances
must be interpreted narrowly: Sexual harassment is "virtually always" outside the scope of
employment. Id. Apparent authority claims must be based on an objectively reasonable view
of apparent authority and are limited to instances in which the authority actually was used.
See id. at * 11, * 13. Third, only negligent employers can be liable in the absence of actual
apparent authority. See id at * 18.
284 CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508, at *4.
285 Id.
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decision,286 focusing instead on defects in the employee-petitioner's proposal. 287
Finally, the NAM/MAPI brief argued that the distinction between hostile
environment cases and quid pro quo cases must be maintained "to ensure that,
Meritor's prohibition on strict liability for hostile environment claims cannot be
circumvented by artful pleading or imprecise judicial analysis." '288 The NAM/MAPI
also advocated a negligence standard for employer liability." 9
On the issue of the impact of employer policies forbidding sexual harassment,
the feminist groups argued that while an employer's establishment of a complaint
mechanism and policy against sexual harassment would not immunize an employer
from liability for a supervisor's acts, failure to do so would create liability.29° The
EEAC, on the other hand, argued that a "well-communicated express policy against
sexual harassment, coupled with an adequate grievance procedure, should shield an
employer from liability for sexual harassment."29'
How did the various amici's positions fare before the Supreme Court? The
amici's positions can be compared to those of the Court in four ways: (1) position on
liability based on Restatement (Second) ofAgency section 219(1); (2) position on
liability based on Restatement (Second) ofAgency section 219(2)(d); (3) position on
whether a sexual harassment policy should constitute an affirmative defense; and (4)
analysis of the nature of sexual harassment.
As noted above, the Court rejected the theory of liability based on the
Restatement (Second) ofAgency section 219(1).92 Among the pro-employee amici,
the NELA advocated liability based on this principle,293 while among the pro-
employer amici, the CCUS and the EEAC argued against liability based on section
219(1).294 The Court accepted, however, the section 219(2)(d) theory, a position
286 See SHRM Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at *ii. The SHRM brief cited the
Eleventh Circuit en banc decision only twice. Once, the brief mentioned that the Eleventh
Circuit en banc decision was consistent with two other cases it discussed in detail. See id. at
* 12. Once, it mentioned that lower court decision as recognizing that the pervasiveness of
harassment should be a factor in determining supervisory liability. See id at * 17.
287 See SHRM Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at *7 (summarizing the argument).
Concluding its summary of the argument, the SHRM asked the Court to "reject each of the
three rules proposed by Petitioner and adopt rules that encourage employees to take
advantage of the existing avenues of relief provided by employers before seeking judicial
relief." Id.
288 NAM/MAPI Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32489, at *7.
289 See id.
290 See NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800075, at *20-*28.
29 EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *22.
292 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2286-90 (1998).
293 SeeNELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180, at *8. The NWLC/ERA/WLDF brief did
not address this issue.
294 See CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508, at *7; EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL
32488, at * 10. The SHRM brief did not address this issue.
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advocated by the NWLC/ERA/WLDF and NELA briefs and opposed by the
CCUS.295. Finally, the Court created an affirmative defense similar to that advocated
by the SHRM, the EEAC, the CCUS, and to that opposed by the NWLC/ERA/
WLDF.296
Understanding the role of the amici is difficult, because it is not known if the
Court even read the briefs. Two influences seem likely, however. First, the City of
Boca Raton was in a poor position to represent employers generally with respect to
the affirmative defense issue. Its policy against sexual harassment had not been
distributed adequately, so the facts of the case left it little incentive to pursue an
affirmative defense. Indeed, as the Court noted, there was not even a sufficient
factual or legal question about the adequacy of the city's policy to require a remand
for additional proceedings on the defense issue.297 Similarly, there was little need for
the employee-petitioner to devote attention to the issue. The amici on both sides had
at least the potential to illuminate the issues surrounding whether to create an
affirmative defense and, if so, how to shape it. The Court did not take advantage of
the amici's expertise, but instead created a defense so vaguely formulated that the
circuit courts already are having trouble implementing it.298
Second, the Court wrestled with reconciling the common law agency cases,
Meritor, and Title VII under both the section 219(1) and 219(2)(d) theories. As the
questions in the oral argument showed, both the petitioner and the respondent had
serious weaknesses in their positions.2 Again, it is impossible to know if the Court
even read the amici briefs, but the amici's additional attention to these difficult
problems might have assisted the Court.
Using the majority's holdings and its analysis, one can examine whether the
majority accepted the explicit and implicit arguments made in the briefs about the
structure of the workplace and sexual harassment. As noted above, the amici had
sharply differing positions on how sexual harassment occurs in the workplace and the
role of supervisory power in facilitating harassment. The pro-employer amici, for
example, either explicitly or implicitly endorsed a view of the workplace in which
harassment is the exception rather than the rule, in which firms differ widely in
allocating supervisory authority, and in which employers, because of their own
295 See NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800075, at *6-*9; NELA Brief,
Faragher, 1998 WL 35180, at *8; CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508, at *10-*12. The
SHRM and EEAC briefs did not address this issue.
296 See SHRM Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at *7-* 12; EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998
WL 32488, at *22-*25; CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508, at *14-*24;
NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800075, at *24-*26. The NELA brief did
not address this issue.
297 See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293-94.
298 See, e.g., Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., No. 97-9102, 1998 WL 789169 (1 1th Cir.
Nov. 13, 1998), withdrawn and superceded by 164 F.3d 1361 (11 th Cir. 1999).
299 See Oral Argument, Faragher, 1998 WL 146704.
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interest in avoiding liability and promoting an efficient workforce, work hard to
eradicate harassment. The pro-employee amici, on the other hand, saw harassment
as widespread, built on power relationships common to most firms, and sure to be
ignored by employers unless the threat of liability loomed over them.
As one might expect from an opinion authored by a middle-of-the-road justice
like Justice Souter (who managed to unite the "liberals" like Breyer with all but the
most conservative members, Thomas and Scalia), the opinion did not adopt a clear
ideological position. In analyzing the section 219(1) issue, however, the majority
acknowledged and rejected the position of Judge Barkett's dissenting opinion in the
Eleventh Circuit en banc proceeding, 00 a position which advocated a view of
harassment similar to that of the NWLC/ERAINWLDF brief.3"' Similarly, in
creating the affirmative defense, the majority accepted the argument that employers
need an additional incentive other than their own self-interest to eradicate sexual
harassment.3 2 More importantly, however, the majority also imposed a requirement
on employees to make use of the avenues for reporting sexual harassment.
An employer may, for example, have provided a proven, effective mechanism
for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, available to the
employee without undue risk or expense. If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail
herself of the employer's preventative or remedial apparatus, she should not recover
damages that could have been avoided if she had done so.30 3 While the Court in
Faragher did not go as far as some of the employer groups wished in creating a safe
harbor, it reflects at least some ambivalence about the view of sexual harassment
propounded by, for example, the NWLC/ERA/NWLDF brief.
It is difficult to find a clear indication of the influence of any of the amici on
either the majority or dissenting opinions in Faragher. The Court did not adopt any
of the legal theories advocated by the various amici. The majority's opinion,
however, did move the law closer to two amici's positions. The AFL-CIO's
argument that the quid pro quo/hostile environment classification was not useful is
close to the majority's rejection of the classification's significance to this case, even
if the Court did not adopt the "hybrid" analysis the AFL-CIO proposed. There also
are similarities between the employer defense proposed by the EEAC and the defense
adopted by the Court, although the Court did not go as far as the EEAC position in
protecting employers.
300 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1539 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
30, See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2288.





In examining the three cases, it is difficult to discern a significant impact by any
of the amici on the Court's final positions. No part of the Court's opinions appear
to come directly from the amici briefs' analyses, as has occured occasionally in the
past. In areas in which the amici differed significantly from the parties, the Court did
not move noticeably closer to the amici positions than to the parties' positions." 4
The amici's contributions cannot be evaluated solely on the final legal positions of
the Court, however, so this Article will now examine the amici's use of authority.
V. USES OF AUTHORITY
The amici briefs differed in the types, amounts, and uses of the authorities they
cited. In particular, the briefs substantially differed in the degree of the amici's
reliance on case authority. Table 2 provides the median, minimum, and maximum
numbers of case citations for all amici and the amici on each side for the three
cases." 5 As these figures demonstrate, some amici cited a large number of cases
while others cited only a few.3" Although one should hesitate to place too much
weight on these figures, they do illustrate the substantial differences among the
amici's approaches to legal argument.
Table 2: Case Authority Citations
Case Side Median Minimum Maximum
All 47 16 103
Oncale Employer 18.5 16 21
Employee 56 35 103
All 25 15 39
Faragher Employer 21.5 15 33
Employee 28 20 39
All 31 19 41
Ellerth Employer 33.5 26 41
Employee 31 19 34
3' The Ivers and O'Connor study, which examined two amici's participation in a broad
sample of Supreme Court criminal cases, found an influence but qualified its findings by
noting that they did not examine whether the Court's holdings also were advocated by the
parties. See Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 3, at 172.
305 See infra Table 2: Case Authority Citations.
306 See id
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Even more important than the number of citations, however, is how the amici
used the authority. Some amici used cases simply as case authority-in other words,
they primarily cited cases to support legal arguments. Of course, in arguing before
the Supreme Court, much of the legal authority is not binding, as it would be to a
lower court. Case authority also serves as important persuasive precedent. °7 Much
of the citation to case authority in the amici, however, was merely citation, without
any detailed discussion of what the case authority meant to the case before the
Court.3 ° s
Other amici, however, cited cases primarily to illustrate facts that the amici
asserted were true. For example, the cases cited by the SHRM in its brief in
Faragher often do not produce insights into the legal issues before the Court. Rather
than providing a basis for legal argument, the cases primarily serve as the source of
a collection of anecdotes about the dangers of allowing individuals access to the
courts before exhausting internal remedies for sexual harassment.3 9 To the extent
that the Court needed anecdotes from lower court opinions to support its decision (a
questionable form of legal argument), a competent law clerk with access to Westlaw
or LEXIS would have little trouble compiling a list of candidates for inclusion.
307 See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the
Influences on the Judicial Mind. An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1377, 1493 (1998) (finding that district judges were influenced by other district court
opinions in determining constitutionality at federal sentencing guidelines).
308 For example, although the EEAC brief in Oncale acknowledged the existence of
contrary circuit precedent, it did not analyze those opinions in any depth. See EEAC Brief,
Oncale, 1997 WL 634312, at *14 n.5 (discussing Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563
(7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998), which held that male-on-
male harassment was actionable). Similarly, the TAB&CC brief in Oncale cited cases as
authority for conclusions about Congressional intent and the implications of allowing same-
sex harassment claims; case authority was not discussed or analyzed in any detail. In the
Rutherford Institute brief in Ellerth, all but a few cases simply were cited without discussion
or with only a short parenthetical.,
309 See SHRM Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at * 10-* 11 (discussing Torres v. Pisano,
116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 563 (1997)).
[The employer] promulgated a written sexual harassment policy and grievance
procedure that was known to the plaintiff, an administrative secretary.
Nonetheless, because of her fear of her immediate supervisor, the plaintiff
initially chose not to complain. When she finally broke her silence, however, her
complaint was investigated, she was offered a transfer to another department and
the supervisor was ultimately terminated. Despite this response, the plaintiff
elected to bring suit against her employer.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/NWLC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL
145349, at *25 (citing cases as "helpful applications" of agency principles); NELA Brief,
Faragher, 1998 WL 35180, at * 13 (citing various cases that provide examples of employers




Other briefs cited cases as authority, but did not go beyond that. For example,
although, as compared to some other amici, the NELA heavily relied on case law
citations in its brief in Faragher, its citations primarily were just that-citations. In
many instances, the NELA's brief did not discuss authority, but simply cited it for
blackletter propositions.31 On the few occasions that the NELA's arguments
required factual support, it suggested that the Court takejudicial notice of the facts,"'
assumed them,312 or derived them from a law review article.1 3 The MacKinnon
Coalition brief in Oncale rarely cited case authority as authority, but instead cited it
to demonstrate the errors in the courts' prior approaches to sexual harassment31 4 and
as sources of facts to illustrate its theory.3t5 In the NWLC/ERA/WLDF brief in
Faragher, case authority also was cited often as support for descriptive purposes
316
or for factual317 or logical318 propositions rather than for legal propositions.
310 See NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180, at *9 (quoting and citing Hunter v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that corporations only
can act through individuals)).
311 See NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180, at *10 ("[J]udicial notice must be given
to the breadth of delegated authority in a modem workplace.").
32 See id at *5 ("NELA recognizes that many, if not most, employers covered by Title
VII have written policies prohibiting discrimination in general and sexual harassment in
particular.").
3 See infra note 478.
314 See MacKinnon Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471814, at *5-* 14 (discussing
errors in Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Il1. 1988)).
"' See MacKinnon Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471814, at *9-* 10 (citing cases to
support claim that "[m]en sexually abuse those they have power over in society: first, women
and children; then other men, typically on the basis of [various characteristics]"). But see id
at *26 (citing Valadez v. Uncle Julio's of Ill., Inc., 895 F. Supp. 1008 (N.D. I1. 1995)
(illustrating claim that "[s]eparating sexuality from gender, hence harassment due to gender
from harassment due to sexual orientation, is impracticable and would lead to anomalous
results")).
Similarly, when it cited case authority, the SHRM brief in Faragher did so primarily
to give examples of legal approaches consistent with the SHRM's view of the appropriate
role of personnel managers in handling sexual harassment complaints. See SHRM Brief,
Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at *9-*10 (discussing Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d
1010 (7th Cir. 1997)); ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/NWLC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145349,
at * 17 ("Other studies have shown that half of all harassers are the direct supervisors of the
target." (citation omitted)).
316 See NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800075, at *13 n. 15 (citing cases
to support statement that in quid pro quo cases "courts generally hold employers liable for
the supervisor's wrongful conduct because he, 'by definition, wields the employer's authority
to alter the terms and conditions of employment"'); id. at * 14 n. 17 (citing cases to support
description of policy rationales used by courts in interpreting vicarious liability issues).
311 See id at *22 n.38 (citing a case that cited a law review article to support its claim that
"when an employer has no written grievance policy and procedure, 'a victim of sexual
harassment will reasonably perceive her only available options to be silently acquiescing in
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On the other hand, although the AFL-CIO brief in Ellerth cited relatively few
cases, what was striking about the authority the brief did cite was that the brief
actually analyzed case law as case law rather than as-factual examples or as support
for policy arguments.".'
The most striking difference among the briefs, however, was their use of law
review articles, social science articles and books, and other such materials.32° Amici
briefs frequently take a "Brandeis brief" approach and, as at least one observer
concludes: "Courts often rely on factual information, cases or analytical approaches
provided only by an amicus. '321 Several briefs made passing use of such material,322
and a few relied on it heavily.323 The SHRM brief, for example, cited material to
the harassment or leaving her job"').
3' See id. at *15 n.22 (citing cases to support statement that "in light of the blurred
character of the line separating quid pro quo from hostile environment harassment, it would
be inappropriate to base the standard of employer liability on any categorization between the
two").
39 The Lambda Coalition brief in Oncale also cited cases primarily as authority for
particular interpretations of Title VII. More than any other brief, the Law Professors' brief
in Oncale discussed the cases cited and did what law professors are supposed to do-it
analyzed them. Surprisingly, the Law Professors' brief cited relatively few law review or
other articles and books (only five), relying primarily on case authority instead. The CCUS
brief in Faragher not only cited the most case authority (33 cases) of any pro-employer-
respondent amici in Faragher, and more than all but one amici in that case, but the case
authority primarily was from antidiscrimination cases with similar factual circumstances and
legal issues. Unlike some of the other amici, the CCUS used case citations and quotations to
make legal arguments rather than merely to illustrate factual points. For example, the CCUS
argued that the Restatement concept of apparent authority was ill-suited to sexual harassment
cases and cited several circuit court opinions as evidence of findings that sexual harassment
,was not within the job description of a supervisor. See CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL
32508, at *13.
320 Ivers & O'Connor found that one of the amici they studied in the criminal context
consistently "used the 'Brandeis Brief approach to augment its legal arguments." Ivers &
O'Connor, supra note 3, at 170 (citation omitted).
2, Ennis, supra note 3, at 603.
322 See NAM/MAPI Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32489, at *15 (citing Fact Finding
Report: Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations as general support for
the following statement: "Imposing a higher standard of liability merely because an employee
is designated as a 'supervisor' disregards the varied roles of individuals denominated as
'supervisors' in corporate America and fails to acknowledge that traditional labels such as
'worker' and 'manager' have diminished relevance in many American workplaces."). The
NAM/MAPI brief in Faragher similarly cites several law review articles and treatises but
does so simply to indicate the source of an argument. See NAM/MAPI Brief, Faragher, 1998
WL 32489, at * 12, *22, *23 (citations omitted).
323 For example, the Lambda Coalition brief in Oncale cited 10 social science,
psychological, or legal articles and books, relying on them more heavily than most of the
other amici. See Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 47185, at *ix-*x (listing
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support its factual assertions about the widespread extent of sexual harassment
policies, the appropriate means of handling complaints, and the burden on the courts
of handling additional sexual harassment cases. These materials included newspaper
articles,324 the SHRM's own publications, 325 EEOC documents, 326 and court
statistics.327 The SHRM brief contained the most citations to such material of any of
the amici briefs on the employer-respondent's side of the case and more than all but
one of the amici in general.
As a source of accurate information on human resource policies or the extent of
sexual harassment, the SHRM brief falls short. Popular press accounts are unlikely
sources of accurate, reliable information, and the SHIRM survey of its members tells
little about the universe of employers because the discussion of the results makes no
mention of the bias introduced by the exclusive focus on employers of SHRM
members.
Two other briefs relied heavily on nonlegal materials. The feminist coalition
brief in Faragher cited thirty noncase, nonstatutory authorities, 328 far more than any
other amici in that case (the second largest number cited was only eight).329 Of those,
a far greater percentage were citations of law review articles and social science
journal articles than in the other briefs. The authorities were used to support claims
about the nature of discrimination33° and women's experience with sexual harassment
in the workplace.33' The MacKinnon Coalition brief in Oncale cited the most
authorities cited in the brief).
324 See Lynne Curry-Swann, Do I Need a Priest, a Lawyer, or What?, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 19, 1996, at D1; Michele Himmelberg, Sexual Harassment: Has Anything
Changed?, S. F. ExAM'R, Oct. 15, 1995, at J 15; Sherwood Ross, Closing the Door on Sexual
Harassment, NEWSDAY, July 13, 1997, at F10; SHRM Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at
*iii.
325 See generally SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, How PREVALENT IS
SEXUAL HARASSMENT? (1994) (providing a sample policy statement concerning
discrimination and employment).
326 See SHRM Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at *iii (citing EEOC Compliance
Manual and excerpts of an EEOC report on "best" HR policies).
327 See SHRM Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at *iii (citing Statistics Division,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States
Courts, 1997 Report of the Director (unpublished)).
328 See infra Table 3: Case Authority Correlation, Oncale, at 877; Table 4: Case Authority
Correlation, Ellerth, at 877; Table 5: Case Authority Correlation, Faragher, at 878.
329 See id.
330 See NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800075, at * 12 n.14 (citing
sources to support the statement that "[w]omen are particularly vulnerable to the abuse of
authority by a sexually harassing supervisor because women hold a structurally inferior place
in the workforce").
331 See id. at * 18 n.29 (citing sources in support of statement that "[h]arassment frequently
causes social isolation at work, including loss of informal associations with co-workers and
supervisors, lack of feedback and support, and loss of information networks").
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nonlegal materials of any brief in that case (fourteen law review articles and books).
This nonlegal material was cited as authority for factual propositions about sexual
harassment.332
Several scholars recently have criticized the presentation of social science in
amicus briefs as "distorted for partisan purposes." '333 For example, Professors Rustad
and Koenig found that amici in three recent punitive damages cases distorted social
science in several ways, including using studies financed by partisan sources,
reporting means rather than medians, using percentiles without reporting absolute
numbers, failing to disaggregate data, and relying on anecdotes and bold assertions
"masquerading" as empirical data. 34 The issue in these cases was not so much
misleading presentation but questionable sources. Both the Rustad and Koenig study
and this Article suggest the dangers of relying on amici for nonrecord facts.
One constructive role amici might play is to provide a conceptually different
interpretation of a case. A crude measure of whether amici do so is to examine the
authorities they cite. If amici generally cite the same authorities, they are less likely
to provide a fundamentally different approach because they agree on the relevant
sources of authority. If they cite completely different sets of cases, however, they are
more likely to be engaged in different conceptual approaches. The following tables
present correlations for the case authority cited by the amici in the three cases.33
332 See MacKinnon Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471814, at *25 (citing nonlegal
authority for the proposition that "[tihe gender of a person with whom one has sex, or is
thought to have sex, is a powerful constituent of whether one is considered a woman or a man
in society"). One peculiarity in the nonlegal material citations also is worth noting. The
briefs author, Catharine MacKinnon, relied on her own work as authority for the proposition
that "[s]exuality is gendered in societies of sex inequality." Id at * 18 (citing CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE and SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979)).
... See, e.g., Gerald V. Barrett & Scott B. Morris, The American Psychological
Association's Amicus Curiae Brief in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: The Values of Science
Versus the Values of the Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 201 (1993) (criticizing the APA
amicus brief in Price Waterhouse for failing to portray accurately scientific literature);
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 94 (discussing the use of social science data in three
positive damages cases). But see Jane Goodman, Evaluating Psychological Expertise on
Questions of Social Fact: The Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 249 (1993) (defending the APA amicus brief).
114 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 143-5 1.
"' See infra Table 3: Case Authority Correlation, Oncale, at 877; Table 4: Case Authority
Correlation, Ellerth, at 877; Table 5: Case Authority Correlation, Faragher, at 878.
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Table 3: Case Authority Correlation, Oncale
Petitioner Respondent EEOC EEAC TAB Law Mens Gay ATLA
&CC Prof. Groups Groups
EEOC 0.14 0.16 - - - - - - -
EEAC 0.17 0.26 0.23 - - - - - -
TAB&CC -0.01 0.15 0.07 0.10 - - - - -
Law Professors 0.09 0.10 0.22 0.11 0.02 - - -
Men's Groups 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.00 - - -
Gay and Lesbian 0.04 0.05 0.22 0.17 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 - -
Groups
ATLA 0.20 0.22 0.46 0.25 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.18 -
NELA 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.18 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.25
Table 4: Case Authority Correlation, Ellerth
CCUS EEAC EEOC Rutherford NWLC/ AFL- NELA Employee
Institute ERA/ CIO
WLDF
CCUS - - -.. 
EEAC 0.27 - - - - . . .
EEOC 0.17 0.14 - . . - .
Rutherford Institute 0.24 0.33. 0.30 - . . .
NWLC/ERA/WLDF 0.02 0.08 0.22 0.23 . . . .
AFL-CIO -0.10 0.09 0.09 -0.05 -0.07 - - -
NELA -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.02 --
Employee -0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -
Employer 0.25 0.38 0.34 0.44 0.16 -0.07 0.38 -0.17
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Table 5: Case Authority Correlation, Faragher
[Vol. 7:3
Employee Employer NELA AFL- Feminist Lawyers' EEOC NAM/ EEAC CCUS
CIO Groups Committee/ MAPI
ACLU
Employee -...
Employer 0.08 - -- 
-
NELA 0.09 -0.10 - - -.. 
AFL-CIO 0.13 0.07 0.10 - -. .. .
Feminist 0.27 0.08 0.09 0.18 -.. . .
Groups
Lawyers' 0.09 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.09
Committee/
ACLU
EEOC 0.22 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.31 0.21 - . .
NAM/ 0.23 0.24 0.01 0.16 0.32 0.13 0.40 - - -
MAPI
EEAC 0.34 0.21 0.11 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.27 0.39 - -
CCUS 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.27 0.30 -
SHRM -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.17 0.28 0.00
An examination of the three tables above reveals that, at least in selecting cases
upon which to rely, the amici in these cases did not view the cases in similar legal
terms. If one compares pairs of amici briefs in the three cases, one finds that fewer
than one-third of the brief-pairs in each has a citation correlation of 0.20 or higher,
while almost half have a correlation of 0.10 or lower.336 In sum, the amici cited
relatively little of the same authority. Additionally, eleven of the eighty-four brief-
pairs have negative citation correlations, meaning that a case was less likely to be
cited by one if it was cited by the other.337 The appearance of these patterns in all
three cases suggests this is not simply a matter of disagreement over which line of
cases to follow, but rather an absence of the kind of dialogue O'Neill suggested was
a crucial part of legal argument.338
In sum, the amici's use of authority reveals three important things about these
briefs. First, the types and uses of authority strongly suggest that the amici often
view their role not as advocates of particular legal arguments, but rather as advocates
336 See supra Table 3: Case Authority Correlation, Oncale, at 877; Table 4: Case
Authority Correlation, Ellerth, at 877; Table 5: Case Authority Correlation, Faragher, at
878.
337 See id.
338 See infra note 360 and accompanying text.
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of particular policy positions. Only in a few instances, primarily in debates over the
appropriateness of the various Restatement sections in Faragher, did many of the
amici focus on the law. Second, the heavy reliance on nonlegal authorities of
questionable value reveals a-disturbingly low level of social science that is considered
relevant. An agency attempting to defend a rulemaking based on such evidence
would be hard-pressed to defend itself, even under an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review. Reliance on such evidence by a court, which lacks an agency's
presumed expertise in the subject matter, would be difficult to defend. Third, the
wide divergence of authorities which the amici considered worth citing suggests that
the amici did not see themselves as participating in the same conversation-their
disagreements were not just on the proper legal role, but on the proper universe of
means to resolve the issues.
VI. TYPES OF ARGUMENTS
A third means of evaluating the roles of the amici is to examine the types of
arguments they made. These fall into several categories, and many amici made
multiple types of arguments. Three main types of arguments appear in the amici
briefs: (1) traditional legal arguments; (2) arguments based on assertions about the
nature of sexual harassment in the workplace; and (3) policy arguments.
A. Patterns
Some of the amici made primarily traditional legal arguments. For example, in
Oncale, the NELA made a straightforward legal argument about the meaning of Title
VII's ban on sex discrimination by analyzing the language of the statute, the case law
under the statute generally, and the implications for future cases if the proposed rule
was adopted.339 Several briefs also raised useful questions about the practical
implications of various possible rules.34° Other briefs making significant legal
arguments (but not limited to such arguments) included the ATLA 34 and the
EEAC342 briefs in Oncale, the EEAC,343 the CCUS,3" and the AFL-CIO345 briefs in
311 See NELA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 458806, at *6-*9.
340 See ATLA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 453675, at *13-* 14.
341 See id. at *4-*9.
342 See EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634312, at *12.
143 See EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294, at * 11.
344 See CCUS Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296, at * 14.
141 See AFL-CIO Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145348, at *4-* 14.
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Ellerth, and the EEAC,346 the NELA,347 the CCUS, 348 and the AFL-CIO 34 9 briefs in
Faragher. Traditional legal argument thus was the dominant (but not the only) form
of argument in the briefs filed by five organizations: the NELA, the EEAC, the
CCUS, the AFL-CIO, and the ATLA.
1. Oncale Amici Arguments
In Oncale, theNELA dealt with the issue of how to handle the "because of'
language by turning the issue into a factual question (neatly serving its own more
parochial interests at the same time by precluding summary judgment).350 It also
carefully positioned the Fifth Circuit opinion as creating an "exception" to well-
established Title VII jurisprudence."' Similarly, the NELA argued that because Title
VII allows for claims based on a member of one racial group discriminating against
his own group's members and does not distinguish between majority and minority
groups, it must encompass same-sex discrimination.352 Turning to the consequences
of the two possible rules, the NELA carefully examined ways to limit the impact of
its preferred position in favor of allowing claims. 353 The brief also set out multiple
methods of possible proof in a same-sex case, showing how each might be
accomplished under existing evidentiary rules.354 Finally, the NELA effectively dealt
with the "feared horseplay effect," noting that courts are constantly asked to
distinguish valid from invalid claims.355
In its brief, the ATLA argued that requiring proof of homosexuality in same-sex
cases would produce practical proof problems.356 This argument took the form of a
series of rhetorical questions about proof problems.357 The Lambda Coalition made
a similar argument in its brief, raising the proof problems that the employer-
petitioner's approach suggested through a series of rhetorical questions.3
346 See EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *8-*9.
341 See NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180, at * 14-* 15.
348 See CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508, at *6.
9 See AFL-CIO Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 799994, at *5-*7.
350 See NELA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 458806, at *6-*9.
"' See id. at *10-*14.
352 See id.
311 See id. at *14-*17.
354 See id. at * 17-*20.
... Id. at *14-*17.
356 See ATLA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 453675, at *13-*14.
... See id. at * 13 ("[A]t what point does conduct equate to class membership? How would
a plaintiff prove that the harasser is homosexual? Would the plaintiff have to offer an
admission that the supervisor desired to engage in homosexual sex with members of the same
sex?").
358 See Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471805, at *17.
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The ATLA also made the legal argument that the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Oncale, and the earlier circuit decisions on which it relied, were incorrect because
they misinterpreted Title VII's language." 9 This argument centered on an-analysis
of the implications of excluding same-sex harassment for the statutory scheme and
existing Title VII jurisprudence. It did not do so, however, in as sophisticated a way
as the NELA brief. While the ATLA's brief set out a straightforward analysis in
support of its position, and the brief was structured primarily as a straightforward
legal analysis, it did not grapple with the opposing case authority. Instead, it
dismissed such authority as "unreasonably narrow, illogical and unprecedented. 360
While the EEAC brief made its point, that Title VII does not cover same-sex
sexual harassment, its primary focus was on the statutory language. Because Title
VII says conduct must be "because of' sex to constitute discrimination, the EEAC
argued, same-sex harassment could not qualify. To bolster this argument, the EEAC
added an analysis of case law to show that not every workplace act with "a sexual
component" constituted gender-based discrimination.36' It also argued that sexual
orientation was not covered, primarily by citing cases and failed legislation that were
intended to add sexual orientation to the list of protected classes.362
2. Ellerth Amici Arguments
To make the argument that quid pro quo harassment claims require both the
"quid" and the "quo," the EEAC brief gave an extended analysis of existihg Title VII
case law. For example, the brief noted that both are elements of a quid pro quo claim
and then cited Henson v. City of Dundee ,363 as well as a number of other circuit court
cases applying Henson."6 While demonstrating that several courts had taken this
approach, the argument did not recognize that the issue in this case was whether the
Supreme Court should adopt a rule similar to that in Henson or some alternative rule.
An analysis of the case law showing that the concept of quid pro quo was embedded
deeply in Title VII would have been more persuasive; simply stating that some lower
courts had followed a particular rule would not compel the Supreme Court to make
the same decision. Similarly, when the EEAC argued that unfulfilled threats were
insufficient unless part of pervasive conduct, it justified its position by quoting and
citing lower court opinions that agreed with that argument.365 When the brief turned
... See ATLA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 453675, at *4-*9.
360 Id. at *8.
361 EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634312, at *12 (citing cases that held that use of the
terms "bitch" or "sick bitch" did not qualify).
362 See id. at * 16.
363 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982).
31, See EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294, at * 11.
365 Seeid. at*13-*14.
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to the argument for a safe harbor interpretation of the impact of employer policies
against harassment, it switched emphasis from analysis of case law to a focus on the
Restatement (Second) ofAgency and EEOC Policy Guidelines.366
The CCUS analyzed existing Title VII case law in its brief and drew the
conclusion that the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment cases
was created "merely to broaden Title VII's reach regarding the conduct that will be
actionable" but was being misapplied to govern "the circumstances under which an
employer will be liable for that misconduct." '367 This argument was based on a
careful legal analysis of the rationales and facts of leading Title VII cases.36
The AFL-CIO made impressive traditional legal arguments in support of its
positions. In arguing the irrelevance of the employer-petitioner's "Question
Presented," for example, the brief set out a thorough analysis of the district court's
reliance on the quid pro quo and hostile environment categories.369 The analysis tied
the district court's use of these citations to the case law and the record. It made a
convincing claim that "[t]he distinction between 'quid pro quo' and 'hostile
environment' patterns of proof, then, is at bottom a utilitarian means of summarizing
two different ways plaintiffs seek to prove gender-based employment
discrimination."37 Similarly, the AFL-CIO looked to traditional forms of legal
argument to attack the Posner "company act" approach as inconsistent with Title VII
and agency law.37" ' In the argument for its favored approach to employer liability
rules, the brief summarized the AFL-CIO position from Faragher, cross-referencing
its brief in that case.
3. Faragher Amici Arguments
The EEAC presented traditional legal arguments about the interpretation of
agency law principles. In making its case, the EEAC consistently relied on two
themes. First, the EEAC presented the case as solely one about the application of
traditional agency principles. It did not, for example, acknowledge the uncertainty
about the scope of the importation of agency principles rule created by Meritor.
Instead, the EEAC constantly strove to fit the case within traditional agency analysis,
relying heavily on analysis of the Restatement (Second) ofAgency provisions and
comments to the Restatement. Second, the EEAC consistently presented the decision
below as "reflect[ing] a consensus of the majority" of circuits and "representative of
366 See id. at *19-*25.
367 CCUS Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296, at *14.
368 See id. at *9-* 11.
369 See AFL-CIO Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145348, at *4-* 14.
370 Id. at*lI-*12.
... See id. at *22-*30.
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the way in which the courts of appeals have extrapolated these principles to apply in
environmental sexual harassment cases.""' 2
Focusing on the Restatement (Second) of Agency provisions, in its brief the
EEAC first set out its central-contention that the issue Was whether the supervisor had
actual or apparent authority to sexually harass the employee. As the EEAC correctly
noted, it is rare that an employer would provide a supervisor with such authority, and
hence harassment will "[v]irtually [a]lways" be outside the scope of employment.373
To establish that proposition, the EEAC relied on the traditional agency test that
compares actions to "serve the purposes" of the employer with those in which the
employee is engaged in a "frolic of his own."374 Cleverly playing on the natural
distaste for harassing behavior, particularly for the egregious behavior in this case,
the EEAC then argued that such behavior cannot serve the purposes of the employer
because of the demoralizing effects on the victim.37 Moreover, the EEAC also relied
on the traditional agency principle that acts expressly forbidden by the employer are
not within the scope of employment.376
Having eliminated actual authority, the most powerful claim an employee could
assert, the EEAC then turned to apparent authority. Using the same narrow focus on
the specific acts necessary for harassment, the EEAC again presented the lower court
opinion as part of a consensus, noting that "[c]ourts using this theory, including the
court below, have applied it very narrowly." '377 Again, by focusing on the harassment
itself as the act in question (rather than, for example, the supervisor's authority to
order the individual to work with him or to work in an isolated area), the EEAC was
able to turn the distastefulness of the harassing acts against the plaintiff. The
widespread knowledge that sexual harassment is unlawful, and the breadth of the
popular definition of sexual harassment, mean that "common sense dictates that a
victim asserting a belief in a perpetrator's authority to harass her must make some
affirmative showing that her belief was reasonable under the circumstances. 378
Similarly, the EEAC relied on the agency law requirement of an affirmative act to
create authority in order to argue that the absence of a policy forbidding sexual
harassment was insufficient to create apparent authority. 379
The final limitation on the apparent authority attack was the EEAC's claim that
the apparent authority actually must be used to commit the harassment. The EEAC
rejected the argument that use of the general power of a supervisor is enough, relying
372 EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *8-*9.
371 Id. at *10.
374 Id. at *10-*ll1.
375 See id.
376 See id. at * 12 (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 230 cmt. c (1959)).
377 Id. at *13.
376 Id. at * 14.
179 See id. at * 15.
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instead on a Restatement comment that only a transaction "regular on its face" fits the
Restatement test.
380
The NELA argued that its preferred rule was consistent with the courts'
interpretation of other provisions of Title VII, consistent with Congressional intent,
3 s
and consistent with "time-honored" principles of common law.3 2 Even when the
NELA turned to public policy justifications in its brief, those were within the scope
of traditional legal argument. Thus, the NELA did not simply argue that its preferred
rule was "better" from a utilitarian (or other societal ordering) perspective, but
instead that the rule would fit within "the modern view of respondeat superior" by
serving the "three principal reasons for imposing vicarious liability. '33 Moreover,
as one would expect from a group arguing for employee rights before a
"conservative" Supreme Court, the NELA repeatedly presented its arguments as
straightforward application of traditional legal principles.
384
The CCUS argument focused on three points. First, the CCUS sought, more
than any other pro-employer-respondent amici, to create an argument based on the
Court's previous holding in Meritor.383 Second, the CCUS attempted to distinguish
the sexual harassment cases from the circumstances which would implicate the
Restatement provisions.386 Third, the CCUS set forth an alternative framework for
analyzing the problem of employer liability based on common law principles and the
Court's approach to analogous problems in other areas of antidiscrimination law.387
By focusing on Meritor, the CCUS brief laid the groundwork for distinguishing
sexual harassment cases from other circumstances involving employer liability for
supervisoryacts by emphasizing that antidiscrimination law is different. This served
two functions: It reinforced the Court's freedom to develop doctrine in the area
independently of the Restatement and provided a rationale for doing so.
In distinguishing Title VII from the Restatement approach, the CCUS took a
straightforward approach in its brief. By placing the sections of the Restatement
relied upon by the employee-petitioner and other amici into the broader context of
other Restatement sections, drafters' comments, and interpretations, the CCUS made
380 Id. at * 17-* 18 (citing I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. e (1959)).
38 See NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180, at *14-*15 (arguing that the NELA-
supported rule is consistent with the Congressional goal of compensating victims of sexual
harassment).
382 Id. at *6.
383 Id. at *13.
384 See id at *8 ("Based on the application of traditional agency principles the appellate
court's ruling is erroneous."); id at *21 (stating that the Court should adopt "a pragmatic,
realistic, workable approach to the problem based upon time honored common law agency
principles").
385 See CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508, at *5-*6.
386 See id at *6-*14.
387 See id. at *14-*21.
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a convincing case that the circumstances imagined by the Restatement sections were
so sufficiently different from those in sexual harassment cases that it would not be
an appropriate source of authority. 8 In doing so, the CCUS grappled more directly
with the interpretation of the Restatement sections put forward by the employee-
petitioner and her amici than. did the other employer-respondent amici." 9
The AFL-CIO made a traditional legal argument, building a case for its
interpretation through examination of the statute and case law. Briefly, the argument
was structured first to establish the issue as one of statutory interpretation, and then
to set out the common law of agency as a means of assisting in the interpretation.
The argument thus began with a short section examining the rationale for making
sexual harassment illegal under Title VII.39° The brief then examined Title VII's
requirement that discriminatory conduct be committed by "an employer" before it is
illegal.39 The AFL-CIO extracted far more from the limited resource of the Court's
opinion in Meritor than any of the other amici or the parties, setting forth a thorough,
contextual argument built from examination of Title VII case law, the lower court
opinions in Meritor, and Justice Marshall's concurrence. The brief concluded:
This Court, after considering the Meritor Court of Appeals' holding
and the positions espoused by the parties and the amici, "declined the
parties invitation to issue .a definitive ruling on employer liability"
because of "the state of the record in this case." Rather, this Court
considered the employer liability question at the most general level,
holding that "the Court of Appeals was wrong to entirely disregard
agency principles and impose absolute responsibility on employers for the
acts of their supervisors, regardless of the circumstances of a particular
case."
392
Thus, the major point this Court made in Meritor regarding employer
responsibility for the creation of a discriminatorily abusive workplace by
a supervisory employee, as we understand it, is that the uncertainty within
the common law of agency noted by the lower court there does notjustify
ignoring entirely the concepts developed over the years in determining the
responsibility of employing entities for the acts of individuals invested
38 Seeid. at*lI-*13.
389 See id. at *14.
390 See AFL-CIO Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 799994, at *5-*7.
391 Id. at *7-*12.
392 Id. at *9-*10 (emphasis omitted) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 73 (1986)).
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with some, but not all, of the entity's authority to set and enforce the
terms and conditions on which employees work. 93
A third piece of the AFL-CIO's argument was to place the factual question to be
resolved in the legal context."9 Unlike many other amici, the AFL-CIO's argument
centered not on unsupported or poorly supported factual claims, but instead on the
legal doctrines governing employers and their interaction with Title VII. Relying on
employers' ability to act only through their employees, the AFL-CIO built a solid
case for its argument that Title VII required that the motive of the harassing employee
be attributed to the employer, rather than requiring that: the motive of the employer
be established in a formal policy. In particular, the brief effectively used a wide
range of Title VII authority to argue that Title VII cases implicitly state that when an
employer representative engages in action authorized by the employer, the
representative is the employer for Title VII purposes.395
The final goal of the AFL-CIO was to use the confused state of agency common
law to its advantage. When there was a consensus in the common law of agency, the
AFL-CIO argued, it provided "general 'guidance' as envisioned by Meritor. But
when it is unclear or "in flux," it does not.396 Thus, because agency law regarding
"the closely analogous question of employer tort liability for acts taken by employees
to satisfy personal predilections or urges while otherwise performing authorized
services for the employer" varies substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it
does not provide "general guidance. ' '
4. Innovation in Amici Arguments
Even those amici that did not rely as heavily on traditional forms of legal
argument often demonstrated substantial legal creativity when they did make such
arguments. For example, although the TAB&CC in its brief in Oncale generally
relied on a citation-proposition style of discussion, when the brief argued that
interpreting Title VII to cover same-sex sexual harassment would be unfair to
employers because employers could not have known the statute covered such
conduct, it went beyond the proposition-citation style of argument. 398 The TAB&CC
relied on cases discussing the retroactivity of statutes3 and made a creative argument
391 Id. at*10.
114 Seeid. at*12-*17.
'9' See id at * 13.
396 Id. at *19.
397 Id.
311 See TAB&CC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 673838, at *1-*3.
399 See id. at *2 (discussing Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), which
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
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that the petitioner's interpretation of Title VII "would be tantamount to passage of
a new statute imposing additional potential liability on employers."400
Another creative argument was made by the Lawyers' Committee/ACLU in
Faragher. The Lawyers' Committee/ACLU brief dealt with the "problem" of the
Restatement texts by focusing on a different set of sections. Instead of concentrating
on the problematic-for-employees authority and apparent authority sections, this brief
centered its argument on the provisions governing when notice to an agent would be
considered notice to the principal.4"'
In their brief in Ellerth, the feminist groups made a number of creative legal
arguments. The brief contained interesting analogies to other areas of the law,
including the law of criminal attempt, extortion, and blackmail, to justify 'its
conclusion that unfulfilled threats constitute quid pro quo harassment. 2 The brief
also creatively examined other areas of discrimination law under Title VII, noting
that the quid pro quo versus hostile environment distinction produces a lesser
standard in sex discrimination cases than in race or religion cases.403 These
arguments raised points not made in the parties' briefs and offered potentially useful
legal assistance to the Court in making sense of Title VII.
In addition, despite the paucity of available legislative history materials about this
issue, a number of the amici managed to construct arguments based on what was
available. Some of these arguments were quite sophisticated; others were not.
In making its legal arguments, the Lawyers' Committee/ACLU made
sophisticated arguments based on legislative history. In arguing that Meritor's
analysis of the effect the inclusion of the word "agent" would have on Title VII's
definition of employer, the brief suggested a limitation on employer liability. For
example, the brief noted that subsequent interpretation of Title VII by the circuit
courts of appeals had changed the impact of the Meritor language by finding that
Title VII did not permit direct suits against individual supervisors." Similarly, in
the argument that the Eleventh Circuit's holding (requiring a report to "higher"
management in order to put the employer on notice) was an improper construction
of Title VII, the Lawyers' Committee/ACLU marshaled an impressive argument
based on rejected alternatives to the Civil Rights Act of 1991. It stated that the
Eleventh Circuit "has impermissibly imposed on harassment victims a requirement
that Congress has resoundingly declared should not be placed on them."40 5 Likewise,
the NELA used a legislative history argument to credibly distinguish a line of cases
cited by the employer-petitioner that required "tangible effects" in quid pro quo
400 Id.
401 Lawyers' Committee/ACLU Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 800001, at * 17-*24, *26-*28.
402 See ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/NWLC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145349, at *5.
403 Seeid. at*8-*ll.
" See Lawyers' Committee/ACLU Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 800001, at *16-'*17.
405 Id. at *24-*26.
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cases, showing that the cases were made obsolete by the 1991 Civil Rights Act's
expansion of the remedies available under Title VII.4 6
In contrast, the arguments in the TAB&CC Oncale brief were based on a more
simple concept: State the proposition, and then cite cases agreeing with the
proposition. For example, the TAB&CC argued that same-sex harassment, which
it equated to bi-sexual and homosexual sexual harassment, could not have been
within the intent of Congress in passing the statute. °7 Unlike many legislative
history arguments, which rely on Congressional records, this argument relied solely
on case citations supporting the conclusion. 8 Similarly, when the TAB&CC argued
that the consequences of covering same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII would
violate public policy by making the sexuality of the harasser and the victim an issue
in the case, it simply stated that other courts had done the same. 49 The same
approach was followed when the brief argued that the proof problems in resolving
issues surrounding sexuality would be insurmountable.410
Similarly, the framework set forth by the CCUS as an alternative to the
Restatement framework was grounded in the common law concept of negligence. To
make the case for this framework, the CCUS began by drawing on prior Title VII
case law to demonstrate that "[t]here is no dispute that a cause of action for sexual
harassment is essentially a tort claim.,,41' Tort principles, however, counsel that both
compensation for the victim and deterrence of the tort are valid goals. Because the
CCUS did not want the Court to focus on compensation, which would require broad
employer liability because individual supervisors are not generally liable for
harassment claims, it needed to create a rationale for emphasizing the deterrence
rationale.
To do so, it turned to the legislative history of Title VII and to an opinion in
Ellerth by Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Richard Posner to argue that the agency
principles "applicable to tort cases as informed by the objectives of Title VII" should
therefore be the basis for employer liability.4 2 The CCUS position on this issue was
a difficult one to support. After all, as the CCUS conceded, Congress clearly had
both deterrence and compensation in mind as the objectives for Title VII. 413 The
argument thus rested on distinguishing sexual harassment claims from other forms
of discrimination. To do so, the CCUS relied heavily on Posner's individual opinion
in Ellerth.
406 SeeNELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353, at *7-*8.
407 See TAB&CC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 673838, *2-*3.
408 See id. (citing two circuit court opinions, three district court opinions, and Justice
Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
409 See id. at *4.
410 See id. at *5.
' CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508, at *14.




5. Arguments Based on Assumptions
Arguments based on claims about the nature of sexual harassment and/or the
workplace also played a prominent role in the amici briefs. For example, the
common theme uniting all of the SHRM's arguments in its brief in Faragher was its
claim that the rules proposed by the employee-petitioner would undercut the ability
of human resource managers-the SHRM's members-effectively to combat sexual
harassment in the workplace.4"4
The SHRM's style of argument can be seen clearly in its response to the
employee-petitioner's argument that employers should be charged "with knowledge
[of sexual harassment] if any supervisor is madeaware of the hostile environment
and has a duty to disclose the information to the employer." '4 t5 The employee-
petitioner's proposed legal rule was incorrect, the SHRM argued, because it ignored
"the significance of employer adopted anti-harassment policies, which are
encouraged and endorsed by the SHRM." '416 These policies placed responsibility for
dealing with harassment complaints in the hands of specific individual employees
rather than making it the responsibility of the entire supervisory staff. For example,
[f]requently, these individuals are SHRM members or have been trained
by SHRM members regarding topics such as how to recognize sexual
harassment, complaint intake procedures, confidentiality protection, and
effective listening techniques. Non-designated supervisors possess
neither actual nor apparent authority to address harassment complaints on
the employer's behalf. Nor are they trained to do so.417
The SHRM made similar arguments about the other legal rules proposed by the
employee-petitioner.'4s
Similarly, although flush with case citations, the argument advanced in the
MacKinnon Coalition brief did not rely on case authority to make traditional legal
414 See SHRM Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at *13.
415 Id. (citing Petitioner's Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 793076, at *31 (declaring that the
characterization of the employee-petitioner's argument is SHRM's)).
416 Id. at *13.
417 Id. (footnote omitted).
418 See id at *8-* 13 (arguing that the employee-petitioner's proposed rule requiring that
even supervisory acts expressly prohibited by the employer can form the basis for liability
should be rejected, because it would undercut the "incentive to adopt and enforce strong anti-
harassment policies" provided by the alternative rules); id at * 15-* 17 (arguing for rejection
of the employee-petitioner's proposed legal rule that employers should be charged with
constructive knowledge of harassment pervasive enough to create an abusive work
environment, on the grounds that it will reduce employees' incentive to report abusive
conduct).
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arguments, but instead relied on a distinct theoretical perspective. For example, the
MacKinnon Coalition began the argument with sections entitled "Male Dominance
in Society Includes Sexual Dominance of Some Men Over Other Men as Well as
Over Women" and "Denial of Sex and Gender in Male-on-Male SexuAl Abuse
Maintains Male Dominance."" It then explored this theoretical perspective in depth,
examining the implications for Title VII.4 2° Other briefs which relied heavily on this
style of argument included the law professors' in Oncale,42' the feminists' in
Faragher,422 and the Rutherford Institute's in Ellerth 23
The law professors masked their assumptions in their Oncale brief through a
discussion of case law.124 Not surprisingly, the law professors produced a brief that
read like a law review article (albeit without most of the footnotes). The brief traced
the development of sexual harassment law, arguing that it evolved to prohibit conduct
that reinforces sex stereotypes in the workplace.4 25 This argument was made through
an exhaustive analysis of district and circuit court opinions starting with 1970s
decisions and moving forward.4 26 For example, the professors noted that "on a
deeper level" early cases "legitimized a view of workplace sexual harassment that
regards the plaintiffs' claims as private 'gripes' rather than discriminatory
'grievances,' and regards the defendants' conduct as horseplay or locker room
antics-normal and healthy manifestations of male sexuality that have simply gotten
out of hand. 427  Feminist advocates like Catharine MacKinnon, however,
successfully "refrained the problem of sexual harassment as a problem of sex-based
power.3
4 28
The NWLC/ERA/WLDF's primary mode of argument in their brief was logic.
429
After a short review of Title VII's purposes, the positions were set forth as the logical
response to the briefs characterization of the workplace and the structure of
discrimination. Thus, for example, in arguing that absence of sexual harassment
policies should be sufficient for liability while their presence should not be a shield,
the NWLC/ERA/WLDF asserted: "Because of the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment in the workplace, an employer that failed to put into place an effective
419 MacKinnon Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471814, at *7, *11.
420 See id. at * 14-*30. Unlike others in this case, including notably the Lambda Coalition,
this brief unambiguously concluded that discrimination based on homosexuality is prohibited
by Title VII. See id. at *25-*28.
421 See Law Professors' Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 531305.
422 See NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800075.
423 See Rutherford Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 151471.
424 See Law Professors' Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 531305.
425 See id at *3-*4.
426 See Rutherford Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 151471, at *3-* 16.
427 Id. at *6.
428 Id.
429 See NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800075.
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and meaningful procedure for handling employee complaints should have known of
any sexual harassment that occurs, and is thus liable for failing to take appropriate
action to end it."43 Similarly, the policy argument for the position also was stated in
the context of how "most women endure sexual harassment rather than confront it
and risk the economic and emotional peril of unemployment."43'
The Rutherford Institute argued in its Ellerth brief that a strict liability rule was
most consistent with the language and intent of Title VII.432 In making this argument,
the Institute relied on a combination of factual assertions, logic, and illustrations
drawn from case law.433 For example, the Institute argued that "[a]busive supervisors
rarely exhibit isolated instances of either the 'carrot' or the 'stick' approach;
typically, a combination of both are used, as the employee alternately submits and
resists depending upon the severity of the consequences and the degree of control the
supervisor wields." '434 It also distinguished the employer-respondent and its amici's
arguments from case law that held a tangible detriment was necessary by noting that
those cases predated the 1991 amendments to Title VII which expanded damages to
include emotional distress.435
Briefs that relied less heavily, but still significantly, on this style of argument
included the Lambda Coalition's,436 the ATLA's 437 and the EEAC's 438 in Oncale, the
CCUS's, 4 9 the NELA's 44' and the feminists' 441 in Ellerth, and the NELA's, 42 the
CCUS's, 443 and the Lawyers' Committee/ACLU's 444 in Faragher.
The Lambda Coalition countered the employee-respondent's attempt to limit
Title VII to different-sex sexual harassment with an argument based on
assumptions." 5 While relying on case law generally, and Belleville in particular, to
bolster its statements, the brief relied much more heavily on psychological and legal
books and articles to support claims about the nature of sexuality.446
430 Id. at *20.
431 Id. at *26.
432 See Rutherford Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 151471, at *5-* 12.
433 See id.
434 Id. at *11.
431 See id. at *9.
436 See Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471805.
431 See ATLA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 453675.
438 See EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634312.
439 See CCUS Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296.
440 See NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353.
44' See ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/NWLC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145349.
442 See NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180.
443 See CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508.
444 See Lawyers' Committee/ACLU Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800001.
441 See Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471805.
446 See id at * 14 n.8 (citing sources to support the statement that self-defined gay men
may sometimes act on attractions to women).
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Such arguments sometimes were made in terms of case law as well. For
example, the Lambda Coalition argued that Title VII's "because of sex" language" 7
was satisfied whenever sexual harassment took place---"[o]vertly sexual conduct
inevitably plays off the victim's sex and thus establishes sex as a substantial factor
in the creation of such adverse working conditions." ' To make this argument, the
brief primarily relied upon the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Doe v. City of Belleville,
Illinois."9 Similarly, the Lambda Coalition argued that Title VII's use of the term
"discriminate" means to use an enumerated characteristic as a factor in decision-
making or in determining the conditions of employment, something the Lambda
Coalition argued occurs whenever an employer engages in sexual conduct toward an
employer.45 Although this argument also relied on analysis of prior Title VII case
law, it is best characterized as one built around a particular view of sexuality.
The ATLA argued that the Fifth Circuit opinions were incorrect because they
reflected a misunderstanding of the nature of sexual harassment.45" ' The ATLA
simply asserted that "[s]exual harassment is certainly not limited to those occasions
when the harasser is driven by sexual desire." '452 Citations to law review articles,
including student notes, and case law supported these claims.453
In addition to the more prevalent legal arguments, the EEAC made two
arguments that relied more on unsupported claims about sexuality and the workplace.
First, it stated the obvious truth that "[s]ex is part of life," noting sexuality's
importance to popular culture "as is regularly evidenced in books, magazines,
movies, on television, and on the Internet." '454 Despite its pervasiveness, however,
the EEAC argued that "[m]ost employers today strive to maintain work environments
in which employees treat one another with respect and refrain from the use of crude
language or harassing behavior of any sort."455 In essence, the EEAC's implicit
argument was that despite employers' best efforts, such behavior was an inevitable
result of a mix of popular culture and biology.456 Second, the EEAC also argued that
447 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994).
448 Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471805, at *6.
449 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
450 See Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471805, at *8-*10 ("Even the very
same conduct, such as rape, uses and plays on an employee's male or female sex differently,
and relies upon each specific victim's gender to demean and disadvantage him or her,
individually, in the workplace.").
411 See ATLA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 453675, at *8-* 14.
452 Id. at *12.
453 See id.





"right-minded employers certainly would deplore the type of behavior of which
Oncale accuses his supervisor and co-workers." '457
The CCUS in its Ellerth brief heavily relied on a policy-based analysis of the
inappropriateness of employer strict liability for supervisors' unfulfilled threats.45
After briefly discussing cases in which courts analyzed unfulfilled threats and
concluding that the holdings in those cases were consistent with Meritor,459 the
CCUS turned to an examination of the policy goals of Title VII.46° By doing so, it
ventured into territory unsupported by authority or facts. For example, the CCUS
described steps a "reasonable employer" would take to prevent supervisory sexual
harassment, but then argued that employers will be motivated to take steps to curb
such conduct
only if they perceive there is a benefit to be gained from [taking such
steps]. Most employers, of course, will consider it in their interest to
eliminate sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination from the
workplace in any event, if only because this type of misconduct leads to
unhappy, and therefore less productive, workers. But because vigilant
efforts to stamp out all discriminatory conduct can be costly, the
additional financial incentive of avoiding liability will motivate employers
to take even greater steps to ensure that they are not found negligent in
their efforts to prevent sexual harassment if the liability avoided is greater
than the added expense.46'
Similarly, arguing primarily from logic and unsupported factual assertions (although
citing several cases as examples), the CCUS asserted that strict liability would
prompt frivolous suits.
462
In arguing that unfulfilled threats were within quid pro quo harassment,463 the
NELA made sweeping assertions upon which it based its analysis. For example, the
NELA asserted:
Given the degree of authority that workplace supervisors have in our
society, amicus submits that quid pro quo harassment must be deemed to
have occurred when the supervisor makes a threat, whether or not that
411 Id. at *17.
458 See CCUS Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296, at * 14-*20.
419 See id. at *15-*16.
460 See id. at *16-*17.
461 Id. at*17.
462 See id. at * 19.
463 See NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353, at *7-* 12.
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threat is actually carried out, and that the employer must be liable for that
supervisor's conduct.
Moreover, from the point of view of the employee, once the threat is
made, it is as good as carried out. Many women are afraid to speak out
against their supervisor. The supervisor typically has more tenure with the
company, more 'well placed' friends within the company and often is in
a position that is more secure than that of the victim."
The NELA also used negative examples drawn from case law to illustrate "the
danger" of accepting the petitioner's position.465 For example, the NELA described
the D.C. Circuit decision in Gary v. Long,466 in which a supervisor raped a
subordinate,467 as the apparently logical outcome of refusing to recognize unfulfilled
threats as constituting quid pro quo harassment.46
Finally, the NELA contended that a two-page summary of a "recent government-
commissioned survey of 20,000 women in the armed forces," '469 proved that
unfulfilled threats cause substantial harm.47 According to the NELA, this study
showed that women who received unfulfilled threats did not suffer significantly
different consequences from women who received threats that were later acted
upon.47' This is an astounding claim, and one which, if true, would surely affect a
legislature considering the issue. Nevertheless, the appropriateness of relying on
unpublished research, govermment-commissioned or not, in a court proceeding is
questionable. The armed forces context also might suggest important differences
between the study and the workplace generally.
In their brief, the feminists also freely mixed more traditional legal analysis with
analysis based upon "facts. 472 Thus, in arguing that there should be no distinction
between quid pro quo and hostile environment claims under Title VII, the feminists
both analyzed case law and agency principles,473 and made unsupported factual
ld at *8-*9 (footnote omitted); see id at *14-*15.
465 Id. at * 17.
466 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
467 See id at 1394.
468 See NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353, at *17-'*18. See also id. at *18-'*19
(discussing Johnson v. Runyon, 928 F. Supp. 575 (D. Md. 1996), and Jansen v. Packaging
Corp. ofAmerica, 895 F. Supp. 1053 (N.D. III. 1995), as negative examples).
469 Id. at *19.
470 See id at * 19-*21 (citing L.F. Fitzgerald et al., The Harms of Asking: The
Psychological and Job-Related Consequences of Sexual Coercion in the Workplace (visited
Mar. 26, 1998) <ftp://www.psych.uiuc.edu/pub/share/fitzger>.
471 See id. at *20.




claims such as "Ellerth's experience is typical of women harassed by their
supervisors."474 The ease with which the feminist coalition brief moved back and
forth between these two types of argument suggests its authors saw little distinction
between them.
The NELA's style of argument about the liability of employers for supervisory
conduct differed depending on whether the harassing supervisor was assumed to be
acting within the scope of his employment.475 In arguing that employers were liable
for harassment in the scope of employment, the NELA cited little authority or
documentary evidence.476 When arguing that the employer could be liable even when
the harassing supervisor was acting outside the scope of his authority, the NELA
turned to a list of cases holding employers liable when the supervisor used his
authority to manipulate the employee into a situation in which the harassment took
place.477 In addition, the NELA relied heavily (and unusually for this brief) on a
lengthy quote from a law review article to establish the parameters of the employment
relationship.47
The CCUS devoted considerable effort to contrasting its approach with that
advocated by the Solicitor General.479 In doing so, the CCUS relied on its claimed
knowledge of the workplace to undercut the EEOC position. For example, the
CCUS argued that the EEOC position was based on "supervisors' purported
'authority' under agency law."4 ° Responding to that, the CCUS questioned: "But
that begs the question: authority to do what? Supervisors typically have authority to
assign work to their subordinates, to evaluate their performance, and sometimes to
hire and to fire them. As discussed above, however, supervisors rarely have actual or
apparent authority to sexually harass their subordinates."4"'
This argument is based on bootstrapping from undocumented facts, as well as
from acceptance of the CCUS position on the meaning of apparent authority. No
party or amici to the case contended that supervisors have either real or apparent
authority to engage in sexual harassment in other than extremely rare cases; the
argument over the application of the agency law concept centered on whether the
scope of normal supervisory authority created space within which supervisors are
able to engage in sexual harassment and whether that mattered under Title VII law.
Moreover, the issue ofjust what authority supervisors "typically" have hardly can be
474 Id. at *19.
411 See NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180.
476 See id. at *9-* 11.
47 See id. at*13.
478 See id at * 12 (quoting David B. Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title
VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed By Their Supervisors, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 66, 89 (1995)).
471 See CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508, at * 17-*20.
480 Id. at *19.
481 Id.
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the subject of judicial notice-supervisory relationships are likely to differ in
different workplaces based on the structure of the work unit, the type of work,
whether a union is present, the workplace culture, and so forth. Similarly, the
conclusion of the argument relies on the assertion that "[m]ost responsible American
employers have heeded Meritor's admonition and have adopted strong policies
against sexual harassment."4"2
The CCUS offered several facts based on amici's "experience representing
clients in numerous cases." '483 For example, in arguing that imputing Gordon's
knowledge to the city was reasonable, the CCUS asserted that it was the amici's
experience that
the fear of retaliation is both so frequent and so intense that a
discriminatory situation may fester long before a victim summons enough
courage to complain. The fear of retaliation is particularly strong in cases
involving intentional racial or sexual discrimination, because the intensity
of the wrongdoer's reaction is in our experience related to the degree to
which the conduct is shameful. 84
Similarly, the CCUS asserted that imputing supervisory knowledge to employers was
reasonable because employers "generally expect" and employees "usually assume"
that supervisors will report such information to higher management.48
Some groups made unsupported claims about the record as well. 6 For example,
in support of its claim in Ellerth that certiorari had been granted improvidently, the
NELA simply listed facts (without record citations) which it alleged demonstrated
that Ellerth had suffered actual harm.487 These "facts" were hardly clear in the
record-the employer-petitioner, for example, had argued that the district court had
dismissed the constructive discharge claim and the employee had failed to appeal that
dismissal.8 Similarly, the NELA argued that the employee had defeated the motion
for summary judgment by reciting facts, again without record citations.489
482 Id. at *23.
483 Id at * 18.
484 Id.
485 Id at *23.
486 See id. at *7.
487 See id. (stating that the listed facts included work-related requests which had been
denied, constructive discharge, delayed promotion, and abusive work environment).
488 See Petitioner's Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 90827, at *6-*7.




Explicit policy arguments generally were minor parts of briefs, although the
Rutherford Institute and the NAM/MAPI"9' briefs relied quite heavily upon them.
The Institute argued that most of the lower courts were following a strict liability
standard for quid pro quo sexual harassment by supervisors.492 While conceding that
the circuit courts' rationales for respondeat superior liability in Title VII cases varied,
the Institute contended that "[p]roof of tangible job detriment has generally been
required by the Circuit Courts only where the issue before the court is whether threats
and conduct of a supervisor may be attributed to the employer under agency
principles," not when other rationales were used.493 Without explaining why, the
Institute then concluded that "the more workable rule" would be to "assume strict
liability for the employer where the harassing employee had authority to alter the
terms and conditions of the employee's workplace.... .""9 Similarly, the Institute
set out a short, one paragraph policy argument that a strict liability rule would "bring
order and predictability to Title VII jurisprudence.""95 This argument was simply a
statement of the Institute's preference, unsupported by any form of argument.496
Except to support its initial analysis of the requirements of Metitor,"97 the
NAM/MAPI relied heavily on policy arguments, rarely relying on case or statutory
authority to support its position except by way of example.' 9 Even when discussing
Meritor, the NAM/MAPI relied primarily on assertions rather than on analysis.499
After arguing that the lower courts "have had considerable difficulty defining the
limits of quid pro quo sexual harassment claims,""° the NAM/MAPI then proceeded
to a virtually authority-free discussion of the importance of the quid pro quo/hostile
environment distinction."0 '
The NAM/MAPI also presented a short attack on the EEOC's position in its
amicus brief."2 Again, the NAM/MAPI relied on little authority, instead simply
4 See Rutherford Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 151471.
9 See NAM/MAPI Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32489.
492 See Rutherford Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 151471, at *12-'*15.
491 Id. at *15.
494 Id.
495 Id at * 16.
496 See id
'9' See NAM/MAPI Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32489, at *7-*13, *15-'*18.
491 See id. at *13-*15, *19-*29.
499 See id at *8 ("Similarly, although not evident from the statutory text, the distinction
between 'quid pro quo' and 'hostile environment' sexual harassment is an accepted part of
Title VII analysis.").
100 Id. at *10.
s' See id. at *13-*15.
.02 See id. at *25-*29.
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stating "legitimate employer interests."5"3 For example, it asserted that "the non-
litigation driven interests of employers-such as the desire to foster a productive
working environment that is conducive to attracting and retaining skilled workers in
a shrinking labor pool-would provide sufficient incentives for employers to take all
reasonable steps to eradicate harassment from the workplace." ' ' This position is
indeed logically compelling, if one accepts the predicate facts, although it leaves
open the question of why Title VII exists at all and is utterly without support." 5
7. Arguments Aimed Outside the Court
In their brief in Faragher, the Lawyers' Committee/ACLU relied heavily on a
form of argument that largely appeared to be directed to an audience other than the
Court.5° Alone among the amici, the Lawyers' Committee/ACLU devoted almost
half its text to setting forth a statement of the case. Seven of the fifteen pages of the
Westlaw printout of the substantive-portions of the brief (i.e., not including the table
of cases, digest, etc.) were taken up by the statement of facts.50 7 In the argument
sections, the Lawyers' Committee/ACLU incorporated traditional types of statutory
interpretation arguments, drawing on legislative history and case interpretation.5 8
The facts "argument" is interesting because of its uniqueness in these cases. The
Court clearly did not need assistance with the facts of the case, something the parties
were capable of providing. The statement of facts focuses on the offensive language
used by the supervisors, quoting at length from trial testimony about their use of
offensive epithets to refer to women and other boorish behavior.5" Almost none of
these facts concerned the legal issue in the case--the question of whether the
employer should be liable for the acts of the supervisors-because only a few of the
facts set forth related to the impact of the supervisory relationship on the
harassment." 0 This argument, therefore, seems clearly aimed at an audience other
than the Court, such as the media or the organizations' membership.
The Lawyers' Committee/ACLU also presented several cursory arguments. For
example, at the end of the brief, the organizations asserted that the remoteness of the
503 Id. at *26.
504 Id. at *27.
505 See id
506 See Lawyers' Committee/ACLU Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800001, *2-* 15.
507 See id
508 See id. at* 16-*29.
509 See id at *3-*15.
510 See id. The testimony by the employees that they could not avoid the supervisors
because the supervisors controlled whether the supervisors would share a lifeguard hut with
the employees, for example, was relevant to this issue. See id at *6-*7. It was discussed only




work site should not shield the employer from liability. This argument consisted of
just slightly more than 100 words, the vast majority of which were a description of
the Eleventh Circuit's position."1 ' The "argument" asserted was that "Title VII
simply cannot be read as tolerating two different standards of conduct, depending on
whether it occurred at headquarters or in the field, but this will be the inevitable
result of barring constructive notice at all but an employer's central site." ' Such a
compressed argument, essentially a simple statement of position, served little purpose
beyond casting the organizations' "vote" for a particular interpretation, as a form of
interest group lobbying, creating a sound bite for news organizations, or documenting
the organization's participation on a particular sub-issue.
B. Individual Briefs
The briefs raised several issues that deserve particular attention. One such issue
is whether there are differences between the amici who participated in only one case
and those that asserted a broader interest by participating in two or three.
Consider the Rutherford Institute's brief. It is impossible to avoid the
relationship between this brief in Ellerth and Jones v. Clinton."3 At the time this
brief was filed, March 30, 1998, the Jones case had not been dismissed yet.514 The
motion to dismiss--centered on President Clinton's legal claim that, even if Paula
Jones' allegation that Clinton solicited oral sex from her was true, the allegation was
not actionable under Title VII because she had suffered no tangible job
detriment-had long since been filed."'5 As Jones's lawyers, the Institute clearly was
aware of the importance of the issue to that case. Indeed, given the types of cases in
which the Institute most frequently participates," 6 its interest in this issue is difficult
to explain otherwise.
The Institute's brief offered relatively little that was new in terms of arguments
or positions. The employee-respondent, for example, articulated essentially all of the
arguments made by the Institute and did so in a manner more closely tied to the facts
5" See id. at *29.
512 Id.
513 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
4 See id. at 662. The case was dismissed on April 1, 1998.
515 See id at 678-79.
516 According to its web page, the Rutherford Institute's "attorneys fight for the
constitutional and human rights of men, women and children who are discriminated against
or persecuted for their beliefs." The Rutherford Institute, About The Rutherford Institute
(visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.rutherford.org/about-main.asp>. The Rutherford
Institute also makes "[I]egal research resources ... available to assist attorneys involved in
constitutional litigation." The Rutherford Institute, Need Help Now? (visited Mar. 25, 1999)
<http://www.rutherford.org/need-main.asp>.
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of Ellerth.517 Other than as a potential signal to the more conservative members of
the Court that the issue was important for Jones v. Clinton, something of which they
hardly could have been unaware, the brief simply represented an assertion of a
position already made by others which was not based on any. particular expertise.
One can imagine a brief from the Institute that would have offered something
new to Ellerth. With its focus on religious discrimination cases, the Institute might
have discussed how vicarious liability principles affect either religious employees
with discrimination claims or religious employers facing claims based on supervisory
conduct. Although there may have been implications of resolution of the vicarious
liability issue for such cases, the Institute did not discuss such issues.
The Texas Association of Business brief, a short six pages, was a straightforward
statement that Texas employers were opposed to the rule proposed by the petitioner-
employee." 8 It did not include creative legal arguments, additional information about
employers' experience, or any other information. Like the Rutherford brief, the
TAB&CC brief merely was an interest group's "vote" for a particular position.
The SHRM brief presents almost an idealized version of both the membership-
appeal and lobbying amici briefs." 9 Short, devoid of legal arguments, and filled with
'helpful' factoids and anecdotes, the brief could be provided to nonlawyers to
demonstrate the value of the organization's participation in the case."' On the
lobbying front, it made a concise, clear statement of the argument that the law should
promote employers who have the type of policies the SHRM advocates, although it
left unsaid why such policies are preferable to alternatives. Combining both
approaches in a remarkable passage in the introduction, the brief asserted that the
type of policies the SHRM advocates would be undercut by the employee-petitioner's
proposed legal rules because employees would simply sue rather than report sexual
harassment. "Moreover, if these policies provide little or no protection from liability
to employers, one must ask: Will employers be less inclined to heed the
encouragement of SHRM professionals on their staff to adopt and maintain them?" '521
517 See Respondent's Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145325.
518 See TAB&CC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 673838.
9 See SHRM Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502. The NAM/MAPI brief is similar. See
NAM/MAPI Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32489.
520 The amicus briefs of many organizations, including the SHRM, are available on the
Internet. See Proskauer Rose LLP, Proskauer Briefs: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (visited
Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.proskauer.com/pressroom/briefs/faragher.html>. See also
Environmental Policy Project, The Takings Issue in the Courts (visited Nov. 27, 1998)
<http://www.envpoly.org/courts/briefs.htm> (including full text of amici briefs by
environmental organizations); Project on Death in America, Amicus Briefs (visited Mar. 24,
1999) <http://www.soros.org/death/amicus.htm> (collecting links to amici briefs on
physician-assisted suicide).
521 SHRM Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32502, at *6.
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Implicit but unstated was the logical next question: Will employers be less likely to
hire SHRM members under the rules advocated by the employee-petitioner?
Lobbying from a more theoretically-based perspective, the MacKinnon Coalition
brief in Oncale offered a unique perspective on sexual harassment law, albeit one that
had little to do with the traditional forms of legal argument.522 Rather than proposing
an interpretation because it made legal sense, the brief redefined legal analysis to
mean analysis consistent with the briefs theory of sexual harassment, and then
developed a legal position from that theory. In contrast, despite the obvious
importance of sexual orientation issues to many of the organizations in the Lambda
Coalition, the arguments, authorities, and structure of the Lambda Coalition brief in
Oncale minimize the importance of those issues.523 Rather than presenting a theory
of how sexual orientation might influence the conduct or experience of harassment,
the brief focused on making the issue a narrow legal question.
The differences between the briefs of the Lambda Coalition, the MacKinnon
Coalition, and the law professors in Oncale provide a dramatic confirmation of the
increasing complexity of the civil rights coalitions described by Wasby.524 Even if
sending a-political message were a legitimate function of amici briefs, what is the
message sent by three briefs from (at least) nominal allies with such diverse
approaches? Should the Court count votes-and if so, how should the local groups
that joined in the MacKinnon Coalition be compared to the national organizations in
the Lambda Coalition? Do law professors "count" at all? If so, do the twenty-nine
who joined together outweigh the greater prestige of Catharine MacKinnon, author
of the MacKinnon Coalition brief? Organizations lobbying Congress know the
currency by which their weight is determined: votes and contributions. For all its
flaws, that process provides a means of evaluation missing from the amici's lobbying.
It is also important to consider some of the repeat players. Two repeat players,
the EEAC and the NELA, had similar interests in the cases, although from opposite
sides.525 Both organizations represent members whose professional activities and
ultimate financial well-being are linked to Title VII issues. Two other repeat players,
the CCUS and the AFL-CIO, also share similar (but opposing) interests which are
more indirect.526 The CCUS represents potential defendants, while the AFL-CIO is
concerned with the impact of Title VII on the structure of the workplace. Finally,
522 See MacKinnon Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471814. The Law Professors' brief
in Oncale shared this approach, although it used a different theoretical framework. See Law
Professors' Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 531305.
523 See Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 471805.
524 See WASBY, supra note 8, at 46-51.
525 See EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634312; EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488;
EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294; NELA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 458806; NELA
Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180; NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353.
526 See CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508; CCUS Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296;
AFL-CIO Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 799994; AFL-CIO Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145348.
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one interest group coalition participated in all three cases-the (slightly shifting)
feminist coalition.527
The EEAC participated in all three cases on the employers' sides. In Oncale, the
legal argument in the EEAC brief was straightforward: Title VII uses specific
language ("because of ... sex") that precludes same-sex discrimination claims, a
conclusion bolstered by failed efforts to amend Title VII specifically to include
sexual orientation claims. 2 ' So far, this is not too different from the employer-
respondent's analysis. Contrary legal authority is dismissed, while favorable legal
authority is highlighted.
The main addition offered by the EEAC brief is a moral story defending
employers: This employer's employees behaved badly toward this employee, but
"right-minded" employers would not tolerate this type of conduct.5 29 The
extraordinarily reprehensible nature of the conduct alleged in this case (and only
alleged, because the case was decided on summary judgment below) could make it
difficult to separate the conduct and the legal rule at stake. The EEAC brief
attempted to reframe the issue by bringing into the picture claims about the behavior
of the majority of employers. 30 The concluding paragraph of the brief exemplifies
this approach by providing possible explanations for the behavior of Oncale's
tormentors: they may have been "mean spirited," found it "perversely amusing" to
torment him, or been "socially arrested individuals who lacked the capacity to cope
in acceptable ways with the boredom and isolation of life on an offshore oil rig."53'
Such conduct would be "deplore[d]" by "most right-minded employers" and be
grounds for "severe discipline or discharge" under "most employers' standards of
workplace conduct. 532 Separating the legal principle from the specific employer thus
appears to be the main function of this brief. While useful for the general public,
Supreme Courtjustices should be able to see such distinctions on their own. (If they
cannot, it is unlikely an amicus brief is going to open their eyes.)
In Faragher, on the other hand, the EEAC brief provided a thorough and
persuasive analysis of the text and comments of the most relevant Restatement
(Second) ofAgency provisions.533 It avoided undocumented factual assertions and
set forth a coherent view of the law of agency. It did not, however, grapple with the
central question ofjust how much the law of agency matters in determining employer
527 See NWLC/ERA/WLDF Brief, Faragher, 1997 WL 800075; ERA/NOWLDEF/
NPW&F/NWLC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145349; Lambda Coalition Brief, Oncale, 1997
WL 471805.
528 See EEAC Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 634312, at *5.




131 See EEAC Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32488, at *8-* 14, *17-*19.
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liability for supervisory harassment under Title VII, because it did not address the
question, left open by Meritor, of which agency principles govern.
In Ellerth, both the EEAC position and the style of its argument represent the
organization's members' substantial interest in the pre-decision status quo, with a
slight tweak to gain a safe harbor.534 Many employers have learned to live with Title
VII, the EEOC, and discrimination suits, if not to welcome them. It is clear that
human relations executives, the EEAC's membership, have done so with respect to
the pre-Ellerth levels of liability. Preserving the existing framework therefore
seemed essential. Both the EEAC briefs position and argument seem less assertive
and detailed than that of the employer-respondent. The EEAC primarily described
the law as it existed in at least some circuits.535 The failure to acknowledge, much
less grapple with, the doctrinal uncertainty that existed before this case is surprising.
Next consider the NELA briefs.536 In Oncale, the NELA relied almost entirely
on traditional legal arguments about statutory structure.537 While expanding Title VII
to cover same-sex harassment obviously would benefit the NELA's members, and
at least some potential clients, the number of such claims surely is much smaller than
the number of opposite-sex sexual harassment claims. The success or failure of the
same-sex theory would have no. impact on that larger and financially more important
group of cases. The NELA's direct stake in Oncale, therefore, was relatively small.
In Faragher, the NELA's members' self-interest (to prevent employers from
securing a safe harbor through promulgation of an antiharassment policy)53 was
substantial. Given the realities of Title VII litigation, one of the primary goals for
lawyers representing employees is to prevent cases from being resolved on legal
issues before trial. Creating a fact-intensive question, one requiring a "searching"
factual inquiry,539 is an almost guaranteed means of preventing summary judgment.
The NELA's position in this case thus is in line with what one would expect, but its
means of argument is not. A group of lawyers, however, might expect a different
class of argument from a nonlawyer interest group, even if the primary function of
the brief for the organization was to reinforce member support. Lawyers, after all,
can be expected to know at least something about the amicus process and/or to be
114 See EEAC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93294, at *17-*25.
... See id. at* 8-*16.
536 See NELA Brief, Oncale, 1997 WL 458806; NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180;
NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353.
137 See supra notes 350-55 and accompanying text.
538 Even if the NELA members' support for antidiscrimination law was motivated entirely
by a disinterested objective analysis that antidiscrimination law is in society's best interests,
they cannot continue their efforts to eradicate discrimination if employers can hide behind
simple safe harbor provisions. Thus, it is not necessary to impute selfish motives to the
NELA membership to provide them with an incentive to secure a broad interpretation of Title
VII.
"9 NELA Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 35180, at *11.
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appropriately skeptical of the value of amici briefs that merely articulate policy
arguments.54 The sparse nature of the legal arguments in the NELA's Faragher
brief, particularly when compared to its brief in Oncale, therefore is a bit surprising.
In Ellerth, the NELA relied almost entirely on policy arguments with little
grounding in either the record or other supporting evidence.54' Again, its direct
interest was substantial, yet it avoided legal analysis. For example, the discussion of
a study by Fitzgerald, Bergman, and Hulin542 is almost bizarre-to attempt to
persuade the Court by discussing a social science study of unclear value543 is an odd
way to address a question of legal interpretation.
The two interest groups with the most direct interests in the cases both relied on
different approaches in the three cases-using legal arguments in one, policy
arguments in another, and so forth. Read together, these organizations' briefs do not
present a consistent view of their role as amici.
The CCUS and the AFL-CIO had somewhat less direct interests in the three
cases. Their interests also were more complex-both organizations are coalitions of
organizations whose own interests in the details of Title VII law are likely to differ.544
Two features of the CCUS Faragher brief stand out. First, although in their brief
the CCUS made a greater attempt than some of the other amici to present its
argument in terms of legal argument, it consistently relied on unsubstantiated factual
assertions and policy preferences to support its position.545 The legal authorities and
arguments functioned more as vehicles for expressing policy preferences than as legal
arguments about the proper structure of Title VII. The CCUS presented a picture of
the workplace quite different from that presented by the employee-petitioner and her
amici. This picture was based on the CCUS's assertions about employer behavior,
presumably supported by the organization's experience with its members. Second,
the CCUS's endorsement of Chief Judge Posner's analysis belied its attempts to
characterize its legal arguments as straightforward applications of the common law
concepts of negligence and tort law agency principles. In sum, the CCUS essentially
presented a purely interest group lobbying position, but made much more effort at
presenting that position as a legal argument than did many of the other amici briefs.
540 It is the filing of the brief, rather than the content of the brief, that matters in this
context. Thus, if the primary use of the brief is for a news release announcing its filing, to
entice news organizations to ask the group for comments when the decision appears, or to be
listed in fundraising materials, its content becomes irrelevant.
141 See NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353, at *12-*21.
542 See id at *19-*20.
143 The value of the study is unclear in the brief because the brief provides no information
by which to evaluate the quality of the study. I do not intend any disparagement of the study
itself.
141 See CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508; CCUS Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296;
AFL-CIO Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 799994; AFL-CIO Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145348.
141 See CCUS Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 32508.
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In Ellerth, the CCUS brief supporting the employer-petitioner overlapped to a
surprising degree with the employee-respondent's brief. While the employer-
petitioner's brief centered around the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile
environment theories of liability, the CCUS brief only grudgingly conceded the
existence of those theories."4 This difference allowed the CCUS brief to offer the
Court a different rationale for the employer, although the briefs lack of analysis
regarding how its standard would be implemented in this case undercut its support
for the employer-petitioner.
One striking feature of the brief was the difference in the methods of argument
in different sections of the brief. The CCUS's analysis of current Title VII law and
discussion of when liability might exist for supervisory acts was based on the
traditional legal building blocks of case analysis. In between those sections,
however, the CCUS turned to almost pure policy analysis, with only minimal
reference to case law. This difference reflects both the relative lack of evidence of
congressional intent and the Court's own tendency toward cryptic language in prior
Title VII opinions like Meritor. The shift in analysis goes beyond this difference,
however, as the brief does not provide authority for its claims about the structure of
the workplace, employer incentives, and so forth.
These claims are central to not only the "micro" question of how employers
behave, but also to justification of the interpretations of the case law made in the
other sections. The CCUS's contention that there is a difference between conduct
and employer liability, akin to the CCUS's position in Faragher concerning the
relationship between supervisory authority and harassment, 47 rests in large part on
its claim that supervisory misconduct must take both the employer's and the
employee's interests into consideration.
Finally, by posing the issue as one of a choice between strict liability and
negligence and the impact of that choice on employer incentives, the CCUS curiously
neglects the extensive literature on this point in the legal and economic literature
concerning tort law.548
In its brief in Faragher, the AFL-CIO provided the Court with a careful, nuanced
legal argument for a solution to the problem created by the Court's vagueness in
Meritor.54 9 Unlike many of the other amici on both sides, the brief did not make an
explicit policy argument but instead developed its position as a legal matter.
546 See CCUS Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 93296.
, See supra note 319.
5 See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). If it were only
my own biases suggesting that this analysis is fundamental to understanding the difference
in tort standards, I would be merely whining that the CCUS neglected to write the brief I
thought they should. More than that is at stake here, however, because the CCUS brief
defines the issue in terms of those incentives. To neglect that literature therefore is puzzling.
"" See AFL-CIO Brief, Faragher, 1998 WL 799994.
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Moreover, despite its ability to make a credible claim of expertise in the workplace,
the AFL-CIO did not attempt to bring its knowledge of the implementation of the law
into consideration.
In Ellerth, the AFL-CIO position was similar to the NELA's on the relationship
of the issue presented to the actual case.5 Its argument was that the decision in this
case did not require a resolution of the vicarious liability issue (which the employer-
petitioner presented as central), thus leaving the question open for the Court to
address in Faragher. Because the facts in Faragher were much better, from the
employee's point of view, this argument made a great deal of sense.
The attention devoted by the AFL-CIO to Chief Judge Posner's "company act"
doctrine is noteworthy. The AFL-CIO spent relatively little time discussing the
various Seventh Circuit en banc opinions.55' Giving seven pages to critiquing an
opinion that got only one vote below suggests that the AFL-CIO either saw Posner's
position as particularly dangerous, or the Supreme Court as particularly susceptible
to his argument.
In their arguments and authority, the feminist briefs attempted to present a
coherent world-view rather than a legal argument. For example, in Faragher,
consistent with much feminist writing about the need to contextualize legal argument,
the feminists' primary focus was on placing the legal issue within the three
organizations' view of how the structure of the workplace produces discriminatory
conduct. Such briefs can provide a different perspective on the law, a potentially
valuable role for amici. At the same time, however, the feminists' approach is
troubling because the perspective largely is built from authority of dubious value.
Law review articles, for example, are a particularly bad source of facts about how the
world works because they generally are not based on actual data collected by authors
trained in social or other sciences, nor are they subject to peer or other forms of
review.
The factual allegations about the structure of sexual harassment and the
workplace in general are disturbing for several reasons. The material cited often is
inadequate-citing a nearly ten-year-old study from Working Woman magazine552 is
not the same as citing a rigorously conducted, peer-reviewed study published in a
social science journal. Moreover, by couching their perspective argument in quasi
legal terms, the feminist organizations undercut any ability to provide a "different
voice." Feminist legal scholarship has provided alternative means of interpreting
Title VII,553 ones with which this author disagrees. These briefs, however, neither
550 See AFL-CIO Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145348.
"' See id. at *29.
552 See ERA/NOWLDEF/NPW&F/NWLC Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145349, at * 17 (citing
R. Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988, at 69,
71).
... See, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
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guide the Supreme Court to that literature nor express a means of interpretation
consistent with it. This deficiency may have reflected an express pragmatic judgment
that any influence the briefs might have at the Court would be lost if they centered
on feminist legal theory, or it may reflect an implicit pragmatism caused by the three
organizations' reliance on lawyers rather than on the victims of discrimination to
shape their arguments.
C. Summary
Some lessons can be drawn from the types of arguments made by the amici in
these cases. First, the amici did not appear to view their role as articulating legal
arguments-even when they made more traditional forms of legal arguments, they
did not do so consistently throughout the cases or even within the same brief. This
review of the arguments thus confirms the prevalence of the lobbying view of the
amicus process.
Second, the amici appear to be engaged not in a dialogue over the issues, but in
attempts to capture the result by framing the issues in different ways. While
disagreement over the proper way to frame the issues is a vital part of legal
arguments, the amici asserted their claims as the result of underlying unsubstantiated
factual claims and only rarely as a dispute over the legal issues themselves.
Third, in his book on Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 54
Timothy O'Neill examined the fifty-one amici briefs submitted by the one hundred
seventeen amici in that case to determine whether "litigation did serve as the
schoolmaster in a vital natural seminar.""' 5 The process of creating organizational
positions in Bakke required, according to O'Neill, that organizations "mobilize their
intellectual reserves" to teach their members and themselves about the difficult
choices that case posed.5 The process of amici participation, as much as the amici
briefs themselves, thus served an important political function.
By contrast, in these cases the principles at stake involved narrow statutory
interpretation, not the broad constitutional deliberation over conflicting fundamental
values present in Bakke. Many of the amici in these cases appear to have extended
the grand scale approach of cases like Bakke to these more mundane matters. Does
this matter? Yes. The amici's nonlegal arguments reduce their own effectiveness.
The successful litigant-as an individual or an organization-must be
prepared to make the opponent's case at least as well as the opponent can.
OF VICTIMS (1988).
114 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
"I O'NEILL, supra note 3, at 3. He also found, however, that few of the Bakke amici
"aspired to or achieved any degree of originality in their arguments." Id. at 89.
556 Id. at 4-5.
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By understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the opposition, the
individual and organization can discover the strengths and shortcomings
of their own positions. The advocacy process is dialectical, prompting the
arguments and counterarguments, evidence and counterevidence
necessary for learning. 57
Even amici briefs that merely duplicate the parties' briefs are worth rejecting.
The bane of lawyers is prolixity and duplication .... In an era of heavy
judicial caseloads and public impatience with the delays and expense of
litigation, we judges should be assiduous to bar the gates to amicus
curiae briefs that fail to present convincing reasons why the parties' briefs
do not give us all the help we need for deciding the appeal." 8
Some commentators believe that amici play a useful role when they articulate a
position for which a party "lack[s] credibility" or is "unable to make the argument for
political or tactical reasons." '559 Bruce Ennis, for example, notes that billboard
owners who leased their billboards to both commercial and political clients obtained
amicus support from the ACLU to emphasize the political speech aspects of the
case:" "The billboard owners.., were not in a position to argue credibly on behalf
of political speech because they did not themselves engage in political speech; they
simply leased billboard space, primarily to commercial speakers."56'
The ACLU may have been in a better position to argue political speech issues
because of its expertise. It is simply incorrect, however, to argue that the billboard
owners could not make the argument "credibly," unless Ennis means that the
ACLU's "vote" on the issue was important because it was the ACLU, rather than a
mere property owner, making the argument.
VII. CONCLUSION
The participation by amici in these cases suggests that at least these amici believe
that their appropriate role involves lobbying the Court based on undocumented
interest group assertions and poor quality social science evidence. Because many of
these amici are repeat players before the Court, it is difficult to dismiss their beliefs,
as revealed by their actions, as simply mistaken.
117 Id. at 17.
558 Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir. 1997).
"' Ennis, supra note 3, at 606-07.




Although part of the motivation for filing these briefs is likely their impact on an
outside audience-whether citing the briefs in fundraising materials or using them
to gain media attention for the groups' positions-that alone seems to be an
insufficient explanation. Many of the interest groups have sophisticated members
who surely understand the limited role of amici, and even those who do not can rely
on "random" successes on the merits only occasionally. Given the isolation of the
justices, imposed both by the structure of the judiciary and the lack of "real world"
experience of many of the justices, the amici's arguments may have some impact on
their view of how businesses operate or the prevalence of sexual harassment in the
workplace. The courts, in general, are terrible places to do social science research
on such issues, and the Supreme Court is in perhaps the worst position of all to
evaluate claims made about the content of such research. If amici briefs are serving
such a function, their influence is not positive.
This Article began by noting that amici often could claim to be able to provide
expertise on issues before the Court, which offers a stronger basis for their
participation than the naked interest claims most relied upon. Such claims must be
crafted carefully to avoid the problem of introducing the questionable nonrecord
"facts" described in this Article. To the extent there is a legitimate role for expertise-
based amici participation, it rests with expertise in interpreting legal materials rather
than with any claim to be a pseudo-expert witness.
The pernicious influences of the current state of amici practice are larger,
however. Participation by one amicus, even if motivated solely by nonlegal
considerations, can prompt creation of new organizations dedicated to providing an
alternative viewpoint. 62
Even on their own terms, amicus participation is not an unmitigated good.
Professor Wasby reports that civil rights groups themselves argued that "[o]ne reason
'Title VII law fell apart' . . . is that 'too many lawyers brought cases."' 563 The shift
to amici practice undermines efforts to shape the law by spreading organizational
resources widely and thinly. Moreover, by bringing groups into the case late in the
procedural history, the chance for the early involvement "vital for making a good
record and for properly framing issues and preserving them for appeal" is lost.5"
This loss can be seen clearly in Ellerth, in which the case's posture prompted one
562 See Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 3, at 164 (describing the organization of Americans
for Effective Law Enforcement, created by a criminal procedure professor to counter the
ACLU's influence).
563 WASBY, supra note 8, at 158 (citing JACK GREENBERG, LITIGATION FOR SOCIAL
CHANGE: METHODS, LIMITS AND ROLE IN DEMOCRACY 32 (1973)).
'64 WASBY, supra note 8, at 158. See also Calkins, supra note 3, at 311 (stating that one
cost of amici's participation in the antitrust cases studied was that the Supreme Court "was
obliged to address important issues, arguments, and authorities raised by amici very late in
the proceedings").
1999]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
amicus to argue that the certiorari petition should be dismissed.565 The shift from
direct involvement to amici participation therefore has negative implications even for
those who sympathize with particular amici's aims.
In part, the rise of the amici reflects the overall decline in legal argument. As
Professor Richard Markovits argues in his recent book Matters of Principle, many
individuals involved in the law no longer believe in "internal-to-law right answers"
to legal (and moral) questions." As a result, they substitute "external-to-law" policy
analyses in their teaching, scholarship, practice, and decision-making.567 The rise of
amici is also rooted in the inappropriate use of the law to resolve social conflicts over
issues which are difficult to fit within legal language.
One cause of these problems may be the failure of Congress and the courts to
engage in quality legal work themselves. Poorly drafted statutes and court opinions
that avoid the legal questions, both issues in some of these cases, provide extensive
room for lobbying. It is hard, therefore, to blame the amici for accepting the
invitation to lobby issued by Congress and the Supreme Court.
The "remedy" is twofold. First, the Court should make clear its use or nonuse
of amici briefs. If the rising tide of amici briefs is truly a waste of paper, the Court
should say so in its opinions.568 If the briefs rest unread in the justices' chambers,
they should so note, if only in a footnote reading: "While we appreciate the efforts
of amici in this case, we found it unnecessary to consult their briefs because the briefs
of the parties adequately illuminated the issues." Such an unambiguous signal would
serve to correct erroneous but good faith beliefs that these briefs are important. If
amici briefs are read but unheeded, the Court should make that clear as well-a
footnote could note that "we reject the arguments of such and such amici in this case
because these arguments fail to address the legal issues before us, providing us
instead with policy arguments and unsubstantiated nonrecord information we cannot
consider." This might serve to encourage more appropriate filings in the future, and
would discourage those engaging in lobbying from touting their "participation" in
Supreme Court cases.
Second, scholars should subject amici briefs to criticism. Given their ready
availability on Westlaw and LEXIS, they easily are accessible for analysis. When
amici make poor quality policy arguments or rely on shoddy evidence, scholars
565 See NELA Brief, Ellerth, 1998 WL 145353, at *6-*7.
166 See MARKOVITS, supra note 22, at 5-7.
567 Id. at 1-11.
568 See, e.g., Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir.
1997) ("The amicus brief does not tell us anything we don't know already. It adds nothing
to the already amply proportioned brief of the petitioner.").
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should say so.569 The awareness that one's brief is being subjected to scholarly
attention could exert a positive influence on future filings.
Beyond issues concerning only amici briefs, the Court should curtail the
opportunities for judicial policy-making by addressing the larger problem of
congressional dereliction of duty in statutory drafting. When presented with an
incoherent statute, the Court should refuse to construct a statute for Congress and
return the problem to Congress. This could be accomplished in several ways. For
example, as advocated by then-Justice Rehnquist in two 1980s cases involving
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") regulations, the Court
could find that statutes which provide unclear directions to agencies are
unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine. 7° Alternately, the Court could
adopt a rule declaring that it would deal with a lack of statutory direction by
explicitly assuming the construction most likely to create action by the political
branches if the Court is incorrect. For example, if the Court confronted the issue of
employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment under Title VII, it could adopt
either the rule that employers are strictly liable (assuming it thought that employers
were likely to be able to exert pressure upon Congress for a change) or that
employers are never liable (assuming it thought that civil rights organizations more
likely were able to exert pressure). Regardless of the rule, the Court should state
explicitly that it is adopting such an approach in an effort to force congressional
action to rectify the earlier congressional omission.
In the meantime, however, amici briefs will continue to pour into courts as
various interest groups seek to lobby courts to gain what they cannot or choose not
to seek from the political branches. Such lobbying impoverishes legal discourse and,
thus, impoverishes us all.
569 See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 143-51 (criticizing amicus briefs for
relying on "Junk Social Science").
..0 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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